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ABSTRACT 
 
There can be few questions more fundamental to political economy than the share of national 
income that goes to capital and labour. The central organising concept of a division of factor 
shares between capital, labour and rent has long featured as an axiom of classical political 
economy in its derivations of essential heuristics of productive activity. Cross-national studies 
of income inequality, and of domestic labour market and macro-structural change have failed 
to adaquately account for the variable distribution of national product between labour and 
capital however, as an essential intermediary between personal income, and national 
economic activity. Labour’s share of income has declined almost universally among advanced 
capitalist economies under the apparent combined influences of globalisation, sectoral shifts 
in national employment, and the entrenchment of neoliberal policy regimes. Existing research 
into factor share distributions has failed to capture crucial differences in variability between 
countries however, differences which challenge existing stylised narratives emphasising 
stable compensation rates, which call for a case-sensitive orientation to the manner in which 
heterogeneous configurations of state and labour market institutions mediate the distribution 
of returns to labour and capital. 
 
This paper presents a contextualised, case-centered approach to the comparative analysis of 
the dynamics of labours’ share of national income, based on parallel time series analyses of 
institutional and structural covariates in Ireland and Denmark – cases examplary of the 
influential ‘varieties of capitalism’ and ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ heuristics. The results 
of a set of time series models show that the institutional configurations defined by the 
interaction of national economic composition, levels of unionisation, globalisation, labour 
market change and financialisation, construct evolving national contexts of institutional 
complementarity and conflict, which in turn mediate the dynamics of the distribution of 
returns to labour and capital. Consequently, oberved cross-European declines in aggregate 
labour shares must be understood both in terms of an historical complexity which transcends 
the limitations of the conventional typologies of comparative political economy, and in a 
manner which confronts the heuristics of macro-economics, which empahsise constant returns 
to scale. 
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1. Labour, capital and the organisation of the national economy – the ‘stylised facts’ of 
economic growth
1
 
 
 
Within cross-national research, a number of influential heuristics have dominated the manner 
in which comparativists have conceptualised the essential character of national economies, 
and the mechanisms invoked in order to account for similarities and differences across 
countries. The core binary of the influential ‘varieties of capitalism’ framework (VOC), posits 
two dominant forms of organisation amongst contemporary capitalist economies; coordinated 
market economies (CME’s), in which government and state institutions play a central guiding 
role, and liberal market economies (LME’s) in which the organisation of labour and dynamics 
of growth are mediated primarily through markets (Hall and Soskice 2001). In the VOC 
approach, firms take centre stage as units whose aggregate interactions are conceptualised as 
producing manifest eonomic and structural outcomes. Accordingly, this ‘relational’ view 
assumes that as firms interact across various spheres and institutional contexts of the political 
economy, their respective capacities to successfully coordinate with other economic actors 
constitute the central mechanism governing comparative advantage. Outcomes within liberal 
market economies are thus viewed as dependent on conventional mechanisms of market 
signification; conversely, coordinated economies are characterised by strategic interactions, 
the outcomes of which depend on the capacities of their institutional contexts to effectively 
facilitate, and mediate firm interaction (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 8). Furthermore, according 
to the VOC approach, no understanding of manifest economic outcomes may be reached 
without considering the embeddedness of economic action within social structures and 
contexts, and its mediation through institutional configurations (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 11). 
Hence, this typology sensitises us to the role of institutions, as regularised sets of practices 
such as legal conventions, education systems, financial systems, modes of governance, and 
industrial relations networks, in the structuring of economic outcomes (Hall and Thalen 2011: 
2).  
 
Other prominent frameworks have also sought to impose conceptual order on the manifest 
complexities of national economies in terms of their dominant modes of welfare provision, 
albeit to the detriment of adaquately integrating the  spheres of production and policy. In their 
examination of approaches to the study of the relationship between political economy and 
welfare provision, Ebbinghaus and Manow (2001) have emphasised a particular lack of 
discussion on the relationship between production and social protection, as represented by 
proponents of the VOC approach (Hall and Soskice 2001), and Esping-Andersens’ influential 
typology of national welfare provision regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Accordingly, both 
approaches purportedly suffer from an inability to examine interactions between the 
institutions of modern capitalism, labour market dynamics, and state welfare policies. Such 
interactions manifest profoundly in the realms of industrial relations, production and 
employment regimes, and modes of corporate finance, where conditions of labour and welfare 
provision are shaped by the national character of wage bargaining, the social organisation of 
production, and the manner in which firms engage with financial markets (Ebbinghaus and 
Manow 2001: 12-13)
2
.  
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 Note: where appendix graphs are cited in text, abbreviations of the following form are used: ax3, 3 (appendix 3, 
graph 3); ax4,7 (appendix 4, graphs 7). 
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 Despite their manifest shortcomings however, these devices point toward a number of key axes of 
differentiation in national economic character, which capture a number of concrete dimensions critical to 
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Less well addressed in comparative literature is a consideration of the manner in which the 
institutional configurations described by these influential heuristics define an evolving context 
of national institutional complentarity and conflict, which in turn mediates the distributional 
dynamics of returns to labour and capital. The central organising concept of a division of 
factor shares between capital and labour has long featured as an axiom of classical political 
economy in its derivations of essential heuristics of productive activity (Atkinson 2009; Glyn 
2006). The contemporary applicability of such a compartmentalised division of productive 
returns is less certain however. As a generalised social formation of production, consumption, 
and institiutional regulation, Fordism described a regime of growth-sustaining collective 
bargaining between capital and labour, providing a hedge against perturbation, and ensuring a 
consistent phase of post-war economic growth (Thompson 2003). The subsequent 
fragmentation of Fordism, both as a concrete social formation and coherent ideal-type under 
the competitive pressures engendered by globalisation and inter-firm competition, has 
produced both a heterogeneous conceptual terrain for comparative political economists, and 
significantly undercut the notion of a clear compartmentalisation of the factors of labour and 
capital. In Ireland, the 1990’s saw the growth of profit sharing and employee share ownership 
initiatives under the encouragement of the social partners, whereby 11% of Irish workplaces in 
1997 reported participation in employee share ownership schemes (Cahill 2000). Irish interest 
groups representing business and labour, such as IBEC and ICTU, have since lobbied 
extensively for the enactment of tax conditions favourable to the expansion of profit sharing 
initiatives (D’art and Turner 2006), and the expansion of the private equity pensions industry 
has served to further entwine labour’s returns with capital markets, exposing it to sources of 
systemic risk, and further problematising discrete distinctions between the realms of capital 
and labour (Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo 2000). 
 
Notwithstanding the conceptual issues engendered by such changes, the concept of labour 
share speaks to a more fundamental relationship between capital and labour, insofar as it 
offers a crucial link between individual income, and productive acitvity. In this sense, it unites 
questions of the organisational characteristics and institutional configurations of national 
economies, with those of the equity of returns to labour under expanding productivity, 
profitability, and changes in the organisation of work (Atkinson 2009). Therefore, although 
attention has been paid to phenomena such as inter-sectoral wage differentials, which have 
variously been modelled as a function of factors such as relative human capital stock, length 
of tenure, and specific characteristics of sectoral labour processes (Gannon and Nolan 2004), 
the concept of labour share permits a further degree of abstraction to the level of the national 
economy, wherein its historical variability calls for explanation in terms of a combination of 
institutional characteristics (i.e. rates of unionisation, government ideology), conditions of the 
labour market (i.e. net migration and unemployment rates), and properties of the macro-
economy such as its sectoral composition, levels of FDI, and trade openness - elements which 
have seldom been afforded simultaneous attention within existing literature on labour share, 
and rarely with sufficient empahsis on the analysis of single cases.  
 
Beyond a relationship between socio-economic configuration and factor share variability, the 
distribution of income between labour and capital further acts as an intermediary mechanism 
between national economic product and income inequality. Panel data analyses performed by 
Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2005), have demonstrated the significant negative effect of 
increased labour share on GINI data between 1970 and 1994. Accordingly, as the distribution 
                                                                                                                                                        
undertanding differing dynamics of labour’s share of income across countries. These dimensions are given 
specific attention in section 3. 
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of capital becomes more unequal relative to that of labour, a corresponding increase in 
labour’s share tends to reduce overall inequalities in personal income, with particularly robust 
effects notable in developing countries whose growth policies often include FDI-oriented 
measures favourable to capital growth. Others have emphasised alternative structural 
mediators between economic product and income equality, such as the growth of 
financialiation. Controlling for institutional factors, including political partisanship, union 
strengh and wage bargaining structures, Kus (2012) has demonstrated a negative relationship 
between growth in financialisation (indexed as as a combination of stock market trade, pre-tax 
banking sector income and the extent of securities in bank assets), and GINI income 
inequality. Accordingly, through a combination of movement away from ‘real economy’ 
activities such as manufacturing, declines in union wage premiums under eroding bargaining 
power, the emergence of shareholder-oriented managerialism, and the growth of top-tier 
executive pay, the result has been an exascerbation of income inequality across the OECD. 
More worryingly, Diwan (2001) has demonstrated, through the use of 3-year crisis window 
dummies, the tendency for labour’s share of income to fall drastically during periods of 
financial crisis. Consequently, these works underscore the significance of exploring factor 
share distributions not only as an exploratory exercise in comparative model testing, but also 
in social policy terms, as an essential mechanism mediating the reationship between 
economic, social and institutional structure, and society-wide distributions of personal income. 
 
Neoclassical economic theory has largely disarmed the question of labour share’s historical 
variability however, through its employment of equilibrium heuristics of factor share 
distribution. Contemporary macroeconomists thus appear content to consign the question of 
labour’s share of income to production-function models in which labour share equilibrium is 
assumed by the standard Cobb-Douglas specification, which specifies a constant elasticity of 
output with respect to capital, and therefore a constancy of relative returns to labour and 
capital (Zuleta 2012: 91; see also Bentolia and Saint Paul 2003; Gollin 2002; Jones 2003). 
Recent texts such as Mankew’s Macroeconomics (2007) emphasise such factor share 
constancy, by depicting labour’s share of income as a constant parameter in the Cobb-Douglas 
model. In this specification, the ratio of labour income to capital remains at approximately .7 
(corroborated by U.S. labour share data from 1960-2006), and variations in rates of 
productivity cause corresponding, proportional movements in the marginal products of labour 
and capital (Mankew 2007: 55-58). Within this strand of inquiry, the question of labour 
shares’ potential historical fluctuation is subsumed beneath this heuristic, which emphasises 
constant returns to scale. Such broad consensus has been punctuated with flashes of criticism 
however. Robert Solow (1958) offered an early sceptical commentary on the constancy of 
labour’s share of income, drawing attention to the role of relative human capital endowments, 
and the growth of income within unincorporated enterprises as a source of variability in factor 
share distribution. Indeed, this latter dimension has now become established as an essential 
component in the calculation of labour’s share of income, insofar as differential rates of self-
employment, both between sectors and within sectors over time, must be factored into any 
calculation of returns to labour. Amid such critical notes, literature beyond the boundaries of 
core macroeconomics has consistetly emphasised the stylised nature of such constancy 
assumptions embedded within neoclassical growth theory, which mandate; ‘...that real wages 
and productivity grow at the same rate, and that the growth rate of output is given by the sum 
of employment growth...and the growth rate of productivity’ (Giammarioli et al 2002: 4; see 
also Garrido-Ruiz 2005).  
 
Despite the apparent consensus regarding factor share constancy amongst macroecomists, a 
growing body of literature has asserted the amenability of factor share modeling to a range of 
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institutional and structural predictors, such as unemployment, union density, strike activity 
and leftist national government (Decreuse and Maarek 2008; Kristal 2010; Guscina 2006; 
Wallace, Leicht and Raffalovich 1999), components of government spending, foreign direct 
investment, globalisation, trade openness, levels of education, migration and workforce 
feminisation (Daudey and Decreuse 2006; Harrison 2005; Jaumotte and Tytell 2007; Jayadev 
2007), and financial crises, product market, trade and employment regulation (Diwan 2001; 
Jaumotte and Tytell 2007). These alternative institutional accounts stand in contrast to those 
which depict labour share variability strictly in terms of macroeconomic parameters such as 
capital-augmenting technological growth, labour substitution, and changes in the sectoral 
composition of national economies (Zuleta 2012). Regarding the role of sectoral shifts, 
Whelan and Lawless (2011: 132) have demonstrated, through the construction of 
counterfactual series, that despite overall shifts toward sectors of lower labour share within the 
EU, and variable growth in capital-intensive activities, sectoral shifts toward lower labour 
share activites account for less than 1% of the decline in labour share between 1980 and 2005.  
 
Others have found stronger sectoral effects, albeit with substantial variations across countries 
in terms of period-specific, and country-specific effects (Arpaia, Perez and Pichelmann 2009), 
whilst de Serres et al (2002) have attributed labour share reductions to the growing importance 
of capital-intensive activities such as financial services with their comprartively lower labour 
intensity, coupled with shifts in domestic manufacturing toward outsourcing, with consequent 
wage depression. China is perhaps exemplary of such sectoral effects, recording a drop in its 
aggregate labour share from 61% in 1990, to 47% in 2007, reflecting the growing importance 
of lower-share services, combined with substantial reductions in agriculture in sectoral value 
added (Bai and Qian 2010). These are far from complete accounts however, as Blanchard’s 
simulations of variable eslaticities of substitution between capital and labour, and of increases 
in the gap between real wages and productivity, accounted for between 10% and 40% of long-
run labour share variations, suggesting an immanent need for an alternative institutional 
account capable of capturing these excluded sources of variance (Blanchard 2000 cited in 
Giammarioli et al 2002: 8). 
 
Clearly, the heterogenous nature of existing research calls for the imposition of conceptual 
clarity regarding the institutional, macroeconomic and structural drivers of variability in 
labour’s share, and of the mechanisms through which these various parameters exert their 
influence at the level of the national economy. Arguably, much of this essential micro, and 
meso-level nuance has been obscured by the methodolgies employed by many of the above-
cited researchers who have typically employed pooled time-series techniques, in order to 
exploit the inherent sample-boosting effect of aggregating multiple countries; in this respect, 
much may be gained by adopting a comparative approach more in line with the case-sensitive 
orientation of comparative historical research. In pursuit of this objective, we now examine the 
summary historical trends of labour’s share of income across Europe and beyond, before 
considering the role of a number of key parameters in the gereration of labour share 
fluctuations throughout this time. Given that these parameters (i.e. unionisation, international 
trade and the composition of employment) manifest in different ways across countries, the 
following section thus contextualises our comparative methodology which seeks to examine 
the historical dynamics and covariates of labour share across two small open economies; 
Ireland, as a liberal market economy which has experienced a drastic decline in its volatile 
labour share since the 1980’s, and Denmark, a coordinated Social Democrat, whose stationary 
labour share series exhibits a much lower decline over the same period. In doing so, we 
implicitly seek to challenge the rationale of existing pooled accounts, by exploring possible 
divergences in the manner in which such parameters influence and interact with long-term 
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labour share dynamics accross both economies, and to assess the explanatory utility of 
existing comparative heuristics, such as they illuminate mechanisms of variation across both 
contexts. 
 
 
2. Labour’s share of income in Europe and beyond: key trends, drivers of variation, and 
axes of cross-national comparison 
 
 
 2.1. Trends in global labour share movements since 1960 
 
 
The ‘stylised’ nature of labour share’s historical constancy belies considerable variation in 
oberved cross national trends. This discontinuity between macroeconomic performance and 
the material conditions of labour, as is implied by sidestepping the question of factor share 
distribution, is further underscored by long-term data on the U.S. economy which, despite 
experiencing substantial growth in per capita GDP between 1990 and 2012, has recorded a 
stagnation in its labour share, and the greatest increase in its gini income inequality index, 
relative to other advanced economies
3
. Much critical attention has been directed toward this 
‘paraigmatic ratio’ of U.S. labour shares of late, revealing both the instability of sectoral and 
aggregate labour shares, and a significant lag of labour compensation relative to proft growth 
(Wallace et al 1999; Young 2010). These alternative narratives thus reconcile observed labour 
share and real wage stagnation with the historical political economy of the U.S., insofar as the 
postwar ‘capital-labour accord’ of adaquately compensated, disciplined labour has steadily 
fragmented under successive waves of neoliberal policy entrenchment since the 1980’s 
(Raffalovich et al 1992). Indeed, the positive effect of collective action on aggregate postwar 
labour share has reversed during the ‘post-accord’ period (1981-1992) such that union density 
and strike activity no longer appear to exert a positive influence on the distribution of factor 
shares, signalling a defensive shift in union orientation toward job protection in a climate of 
increasing instability, rather than compensation enhancement (Wallace et al 1992: 284).  
 
In Europe, observed labour share trends are even less reconcilable with the assumption of 
factor share constancy, and beyond the U.S. (with the exception of Japan), the state of labour’s 
declining share of income across the OECD is no longer in doubt. Figure 1 (below) illustrates 
aggregate trends across the EU-27, and figure 2 offers a country-level breakdown of those 
member states for which a complete set of data were available for appropriate adjusted 
calculations (see section 3 concerning the measurement of labour share). In contrast to the 
relative stability of the U.S. series, European labour shares exhibit a hump-shaped distribution, 
with labour’s share of income peaking during the early 1980’s, before embarking on a 
sustained, albeit punctuated period of decline as depicted in figure 1. Many accounts have 
been forwarded of this characteristically European shape echoing those introduced above, 
such as growth in capital-augmenting technology during the ‘I.T. revolution’ of the 1980’s, 
and sectoral transitions such as those responsible for China’s dramatic decline throghout the 
1990’s. Guscina’s results have largely confirmed this line of argument, finding a postive 
(labour-augmenting) association between productivity and labour share until 1985, after which 
labour productivity switches sign to bcome capital-augmenting (2006: 11). Furthermore, 
sustained growth in European capital shares – the inverse of labour’s share – has been 
                                                 
3
 International Labour Organisation (2008). World of Work Report 2008: Income Inequalities in the Age of 
Financial Globalization. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. 
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accounted for in terms of a range of factors crucial to understanding the economic trajectories 
of many European states, such as capital account liberalisation, product market deregulation, 
expansions in low-wage labour supplies, labour market deregulation and bargaining 
decentralisation (even amongst the highly unionised Ghent countries), and domestic wage and 
input cost depression through the availability of cheap industrial imports from developing 
countries (Ellis and Smith 2007; Kristal 2010). Changes in regulatory governance have 
exerted particular influence on compensation dynamics, insofar as labour market deregulation 
has generally served to decrease short-term wages, particularly amongst states with strong 
foreign direct investment (FDI) growth. Concurrent product market deregulation across 
Europe since the 1990’s has in turn exascerbated labour share declines, through falling 
profitability and a resultant weaker bargaining position for labour (Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2003). Within Europe, this has paradoxically occured against a backdrop of growth in the 
number of high-skilled workers (European Commission 2007), albeit with a sustained decline 
in economy-wide union densities amongst many states (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1995; Visser 
2006). The evident heterogeneity in labour share dynamics across European member states 
further calls into question the explanatory utility of essentialised models of change, given that 
the states depicted in figure 2 exhibit competing levels, fluctuations, and trending directions 
over time – with Belgium recording moderate increases. 
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Figure 1. Pooled unit-mean labour share trends (EU-27), 1960-2011 
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Figure 2. European labour share trends (states with complete adjusted series), 1960-2011 
 
 
As previously discussed, many authors have emphasised the capacity of shifts in the 
composition of national economies toward lower share sectors, to reduce aggregate labour 
shares, whereby declining labour share levels result from shifts in employment away from 
labour-intensive sectors such as manufacturing, toward capital-intensive services, such as 
those of finance and business. By such accounts, and in the context of Europe, falls in labour 
shares owe less to the effects of firm-level wage moderation under market liberalisation, and 
more to the growing centrality of low wage share sectors in national output statistics, along 
with changes in the proportions of self-employed persons within high remuneration sectors 
(Arpaia, Perez and Pichelmann 2009; De Serres et al 2002). By such accounts, aggregate 
labour share declines throughout the 1990’s reflect a fall in the level of unskilled labour, along 
with widespread increases in employment, which have outpaced growth in real compensation 
per worker (Jaumotte and Tytell 2007: 9). Conceptualising labour’s share as an indicator of 
the relative bargaing power of labour, it appears that gains in labour share achieved throughout 
the 1970’s may thus partly be accounted for in terms of collective resistence to wage reduction 
through strong union bargaining capacities, a perspective which emphasises the ability of 
subsequent developments alongside sectoral shifts, such as the growth of non-wage 
compensation and rising self-employment, to depress aggregate labour shares.  
 
It thus appears that consensus on the appropriate combination of factors contributing to the 
decline of labour’s share of income is elusive, although it is clear that some combination of 
explanatory variables is warranted in order to generate a coherent account of historical factor 
share dynamics. Bentolia and Saint Paul’s (2003) pooled sectoral analysis of labour share 
movements has empahsised the capacity of factors such as changes in production input costs, 
and labour adjustment costs along with changes in union bargaining power to edge capital-
labour ratios away from a stable, complementary relationship, as mandated by the Cobb-
Douglas formulation. According to their analysis (which does not incorporate a measure of 
unionisation but rather a proxy of ‘labor conflict rates’), falling labour shares are mediated 
partly by the specific character of national and sectoral bargaining processes, although these 
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results are not decomposed to sectoral or country level. Similarly, institutional 
complementarities amongst firms, individuals, and the organisation of work come into play 
around the question of labour adjustment costs, insofar as the presence of greater recruitment 
and discharge costs, or legal requirements of severance pay provision on the part of 
employers, serve to drive factor shares from their equilibrium ratios (Ellis and Smith 2007) – 
an outcome whose cross-national variation is doubtless dependent on the sectoral composition 
and specific character of the national economy, including the skill-intensity profile of its 
labour force, and national modes of education and training provision. Consequently, the 
presence of substantial variability within Europe, in terms of labour and product market 
governance regimes, suggests that some attention must be paid to the critical dimensions along 
which states may be differentiated, not only in terms of their productive activities, but also in 
term of their regulatory profiles, and broader institutional configurations (Balnchard and 
Giavazzi 2003; Hall and Gingerich 2004). 
 
 
 2.2. Toward a holistic conceptual model of labour share’s historical dynamics and
 drivers of variation 
 
 
To date, little attempt has been made to forward a coherent conceptual model of labour share 
movements which adequately integrates the complex range of determinants and parameters 
introduced throughout this paper. The most comprehensive attempt to integrate these 
dimensions, with a conceptualisation of labour share as the relative bargaining capacity of 
labour, has come from Tal Kristal (2010). Her model involves decomposing labour’s share 
into its constituents – compensation, employment and productivity – whilst further dividing 
working class organisational power (i.e. its ability to affect favourable changes in these 
components), into that of the economic, political and global spheres (Kristal 2010: 738). 
Although this offers a worthwhile, multilevel bridge between conventional economic and 
political-economic accounts of labour share variation, it is arguably less suited to the task of 
localised cross-national comparison. Therefore, although this conceptual model accounts for a 
variety of dimensions of working class organisational capacity, in light of the substantial and 
variable transitions experienced by European labour markets over past decades, an alternative 
model is arguably required, one which is capable of assessing intra-class and intra-sectoral 
organisational capability, and – especially in the case of small open economies such as Ireland 
and Denmark - the ability of the ‘state-labour-economy nexus’ to hedge against market 
perturbation, and to moderate the distribution of national income between labour and capital. 
Given that labour share acts as an essential mediator of individual-level income inequality 
(both of which exhibit significant historical variation across countries), it is essential that any 
such model be capable of adequately integrating these dimensions and historical dynamics 
across a range of single-case contexts. 
 
Our alternative model is illustrated below in figure 3. The various dimensions along which we 
might expect to find coherent relationships to labour’s share are partailed into four essential 
organisational domains; those of the political-economic (1), macro-economy (2), labour 
market (3), and financialisation (4). Accordingly, this schematic prefigures our forthcoming 
model specification, by including within each domain a set of key variables, and their 
expected direction of association with levels of labour share. Furthermore, each domain may 
be connected to a specific set of dominant narratives, each of which depicts the relationship of 
these domains to broader national and global socio-economic processes. Finally, each of these 
domains, although rendered analytically distinct for the purposes of modeling, may be viewed 
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as continually interacting with each other across national contexts, and over time within 
countries - interactions which are well articulated within existing literatures on varieties of 
capitalism, and worlds of welfare capitalism. Although these four dimensions are modelled 
with the same techniques and using similar data structures, they speak to a number of 
hierarchical levels from the micro to the global, and their interpretation calls for the 
imposition of a range of narratives of institutional change beyond those currently provided by 
mainstream comparative-historical literatures, which emphasise an understanding of agent-
level interactions in the production of aggregate dynamics of change (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005). The outcomes of these confluences of national 
configurational complexity, and global influence, captured by these four organisational 
domains, are the share of income accruing to labour, the extent of inter-sectoral wage 
differentials, and aggregate income inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A conceptual model of sources of labour share variation 
 
 
 1. Political-economic 
 
 
Unionisation and union density (union) feature as common predictors of labour share 
variation within much existing literature (Daudey and Decreuse 2006; Guscina2006; Jaumotte 
and Tytell 20007; Jayadev 2007; Kristal 2010; Wallace et al 1999). The hypothesised effects 
of unionisation manifest through a variety of direct and indirect mechanisms. Classically 
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unionisation, as a measure of the organisational capacity of labour, serves to increase labours 
bargaining power both through the imminent threat of strike action (with potential losses in 
output for capital), and by representing members interests in wage bargaining processes. 
Indirectly, higher union densities coupled with centralised systems of wage negotiation, tend 
to depress inter and intra-sectoral wage differentials by setting sectoral level baseline wage 
rates. Similarly, in states with lower union densities, unionisation may establish a union wage 
premium amongst workers with similar qualifications, although this effect should be more 
pronounced in states with lower baseline union densities, such that union membership confers 
competitive advantages within sectors with adequate, and influential union coverage. Such 
relationships are far from uniform however, and the specific effect of unionisation on labour 
share depends intimately upon the institutional architecture of domestic industrial relations 
systems, and the manner in which wage bargaining is conducted; either through centralised 
systems of cross-sectoral wage negotiation, or through decentralised systems where wage and 
remuneration bargaining takes place primarily at firm level. Under decentralised bargaining, 
inter-firm and inter-sectoral wage differentials tend to be broader, executive pay growth tends 
to be greater, whilst an increased exposure of wage determination to market forces tends to 
weaken the bargaining power of low-wage labour, resulting in greater long-term reductions in 
labour share (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). Regardless of such variations in cross-national 
effect size however, the direction of association between unionisation and labour share should 
be positive, a conclusion which is largely borne out by existing research (see appendix 6).  
 
Political partisanship (left) is crucial to the bargaining power of labour, insofar as national 
legislatures with predominantly leftist members should tend to enact legislation, and adopt 
policy positions more favourable to labour’s interests. Typically, leftist cabinets can augment 
labour’s share of income by enacting legislation around pay equalisation or minimum wage 
setting, thus insulating low-wage labour from competitive market pressures and wage 
depression in times of high unemployment. Amongst the European Social Democrats, 
governing parties have often enacted measures aimed at income redistribution through 
progressive taxation, and the use of egalitarian social transfers (Kristal 2010: 739), whilst 
greater Democrat presence in the U.S. houses of congress has been found to exert a negative 
effect on top 1% income shares (Volscho and Kelly 2012). The favourable orientation of 
European leftist parties toward the interests of labour is further underscored in light of recent 
adjustments in employment protection measures and flexicurity enacted throughout the 
financial crisis, during which successive centre-right Irish administrations have frozen 
vocational training funding, reduced levels of welfare to new young claimants, and adopted a 
more coercive approach to welfare provision (Heyes 2013: 5-6). Similarly, their conservative 
U.K. counterparts have eliminated the ‘Young Person’s Guarantee’ initiative and the 
‘Educational Maintenance Allowance’ (aimed primarily at low income families), whilst 
extending the reach of means testing further than their Labour predecessors (ibid: 7). 
Consequently, the effect of greater leftist presence in national administrations should exert a 
positive influence on labour share, with the caveat that such an outcome depends on the 
manner in which national governments are formed. In cases such as Ireland, parties of the left 
have typically entered government as minority coalition partners, significantly diluting their 
capacity to enact policies favourable to redistribution. 
 
There exists a substantial body of literature addressing the welfare provision strategies 
(welfare) of small open economies. According to Katzenstein’s elaboration of the 
‘compensation hypothesis’, small states typically complement their liberal orientations with 
parallel domestic measures aimed at offsetting the exposure to market volatility engendered 
by increased openness (1985: 47). Such measures have included the promotion of strong 
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public sector employment growth, the provision of vocational training to facilitate up-skilling, 
domestic wage restraint through centralised bargaining, and increased provision of welfare 
and social transfers. Increased openness presents a number of challenges for labour within 
small open economies, such as the undercutting of domestic input costs through imports from 
low wage countries, and a reduction in investor exit costs under the effects of globalisation, 
and increased capital mobility - which in turn expose labourers to volatile global competition, 
placing them in a weaker bargaining position relative to mobile capital (Burgoon 2001). 
Welfare functions not only as a reactive safety or hedge against perturbation however, as 
others have drawn attention to the manner in which various strategies of welfare provision 
shape the productive capacities and competitive profiles of individual states, outcomes which 
are shown to vary profoundly along the ‘liberal-coordinated’ continuum (Busemeyer 2009). 
Furthermore, the tendency to focus on quantitative determinants of welfare component 
spending in existing studies has arguably shifted attention away from the political-economic 
dimension of welfare provision, or the institutional-political determinants of national welfare 
strategies (Katzenstein 2003). In this sense, welfare spending resides logically within the 
political-economic domain of our model, insofar as its included covariates are consistent with 
existing theory, specifying as they do an interaction between the characteristics of state and 
economy. The effects of welfare spending may thus be expected to influence labour share 
through a number of channels, such as protecting against wage depression in countries with 
low employment turnover and salary-indexed unemployment compensation (which in turn 
sets a reservation wage), or by facilitating up-skilling and continued workforce participation 
through active labour market policy spending (ALMP); in both instances, the hypothesised 
relationship suggests a positive effect. 
 
Increased levels of foreign direct investment (fdi) have characterised the development 
trajectories of many globalising worldwide economies in recent decades; within existing 
research, the specific effect of net FDI inflows has typically been recorded as negative 
(Decreuse and Maarek 2008; Harrison 2005; Hutchinson and Persyn 2009). Worldwide, the 
effect of increased capital account openness has been a consolidation of capital’s bargaining 
power relative to labour, insofar as mobile capital generally enjoys lower relocation costs 
relative to labour, and is therefore capable of more easily seeking out greater returns from 
beyond its host economy (Harrison 2005: 4). The growth of globalised, networked firms 
embedded within complex trans-national production chains further serves to augment firm 
flexibility, effects which have been especially pronounced in developed economies (Jayadev 
2007: 3-4). This increased openness interacts with other dimensions of the political-economic 
organisational domain, insofar as increased capital mobility serves to expose labour to 
external sources of economic volatility, as implied by the compensation hypothesis (ibid: 7). 
Alternatively, globalisation may affect labour’s share indirectly, by placing a greater  
proportion of the overall tax burden on labour, given that many small open economies – 
particularly Ireland – have pursued regimes of light-touch regulation with low rates of capital 
gains and corporate tax. Consequently, a variable measuring net FDI inflow should act as a 
proxy for the ease with which capital is capable of moving within and from a host economy, 
indicating its comparative bargaining power relative to labour, whose relocation costs tend to 
be greater (Harrison 2005).  
 
Our analysis treats FDI in a number of complementary manners. In the case of small open 
economies, levels of FDI relate to the classical question of capital-augmenting technological 
development, in which case the effects of technologically-intensive multinational FDI should 
present as negative, despite expected multinational wage premiums (Decreuse and Maarek 
2008: 10-11). Net FDI inflow also presents a computational issue, insofar as multinational 
13 
 
transfer pricing activities, which vary profoundly by country and by sector (Barry 2005), may 
result in higher levels of aggregate gross value added, a greater denominator in the labour 
share equation, and a consequent depression of real labour share estimates (these effects are 
controlled for in our estimation of labour share by adopting a GNI rather than GDP 
calculation). Furthermore, despite increased inter-firm labour market competition, 
multinationals generally enjoy greater levels of productivity, and lower wage demands 
relative to local competitors in frictional labour markets. In such instances, productivity tends 
to outstrip real wage increases, resulting in a depression of labour share (Decreuse and 
Maarek 2008: 24). Finally, multinationals have often engaged in union avoidance strategies 
such as ‘double breasting’ (Lamare et al 2009), or outright non-recognition (Gunnigle et al 
2002), such that in countries with comparatively lower levels of union density, the effect of 
FDI-induced wage premiums is likely to be muted, yielding a negative effect on labour share 
due to stunted bargaining power. This effect should in turn present as less significant amongst 
states with higher levels of unionisation, and bargaining strategies of broader coverage which 
protect against the emergence of inter-sectoral wage differentials, and establish consistent 
union wage premiums. 
 
 
 2. Macro-economy 
 
 
The collection of variables included within the macro-economy sphere capture a number of 
related dimensions of structural and macroeconomic change, which feature as classical drivers 
of variation in the components of labour share, and which represent competing sectoral 
interests. Together, these variables are characteristic of socio-economic changes in the cases 
which form the basis of the analytical component of this paper. Trade is undoubtedly one of 
the key structural indicators of macro-economic change in recent decades, as evidenced by the 
prolific literatures within the social sciences on globalisation, and post-industrial transition. It 
also presents substantial empirical and theoretical associations with a number of variables 
from the political-economic domain such as fdi intensity, and the political-economic 
configurations of national economies as captured by left, union and welfare. As a measure of 
net global trade participation (goods and services imports and exports as a % of global trade), 
this dimension captures the influence of competitive external pressures engendered through 
the availability of cheap global imports, we well as a number of related mechanisms 
introduced above - such as downward wage pressures within incumbent firms subject to 
international competition in terms of both wages and factor costs, or within those firms 
consisting primarily of lower skilled labour - under the effects of globalisation and labour 
market deregulation. Others have detected such effects in cross-national models, in the form 
of a gradual adjustment of capital-labour ratios to capital-augmenting technological growth, 
particularly since the 1980’s (Guscina 2006). Similarly, we should expect the effects of global 
trade participation to track and interact with some of those considered above, such as capital 
flow liberalisation, and product market deregulation, which in turn facilitate the movement of 
greater volumes of goods and services. As a result, the expected direction of association with 
labour’s share of income is negative, despite hypothesised gains in productivity and 
employment wrought through increased trade participation and openness. 
 
The transition to majority employment in services (service) constitutes one of the central 
narratives of socioeconomic change in recent decades, and one of the hallmarks of post-
industrialism within contemporary social theory. Literature surrounding the compensation 
hypothesis has long specified public service employment growth as one of the key channels 
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through which small open states exert control over their domestic economies, thereby 
avoiding over-dependence on external employment sources by effectively nationalising 
substantial portions of their expenditure (Katzenstein 1985: 54). Public employment also 
tends to compress wage differentials due to the high-skill demands of many of its activities, 
whilst also favouring greater levels of unionisation (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). Public 
employment is not the only feature of service sector growth however; in the case of Ireland, 
industrial development led to parallel employment growth in personal services, retail and 
sales, transport, financial services, and business related services (Ó’ Riain 2000 and own 
calculations). Ireland’s combined service sector employment grew from 57% in 1985 to 75% 
in 2010, reflecting a curious feature of Ireland’s development, namely its transition to a 
service economy without an associated interim period of industrialisation typical of other 
developed economies. Similarly, Denmark’s service sector employment grew from 65% in 
1985, to 77% in 2010, although its earlier public employment consolidation likely accounts 
for this discrepancy in base services employment levels. The overall impression is not one of 
uniform, distributed gains for labour through competitive up-skilling however. Increased 
employment in services tends to direct union densities away from their ‘core’ memberships of 
industrial employees, whilst certain sub-sectors such as retail, have exhibited low levels of 
union engagement, and a proliferation of casual employment, rendering coordinated 
bargaining beyond firm level decidedly difficult (Hardimann et al 2008). Conversely, the 
growth of executive pay in areas such as financial services, where remuneration often 
consisted of substantial bonuses and stock options (Atkinson 2009; Ó’ Riain 2012), has 
resulted in an exacerbation of intra-sectoral pay differentials and overall wage inequality, and 
an inflation of capital output in activities such as finance which reside beyond those of the 
‘real economy’. As a result, increased service employment, in combination with a range of 
other factors such as casualisation, decreased unionisation, labour force feminisation and 
immigration, should exert a negative influence both on overall wage inequality, and on 
labours share of income. 
 
In contrast to the comparative insecurity of low paid service sector employment, a crucial 
feature of both Ireland and Denmark’s economic growth narratives throughout previous 
decades has been the growing importance of high-tech activities (comp), such as the software 
sector in Ireland, and Danish biotechnology. The skill-intensity profile of much of this work 
has typically engendered upward wage pressures in technology-intensive sectors, imposing a 
wage premium on highly skilled, mobile workers (Hardimann 2008). The effect of education 
and skill-intensity on labour share has previously been subject to favourable analyses, which 
have found a positive association between higher education and labour share (Daudey and 
Decreuse 2006). This is largely due to the greater adaptability skills conferred through higher 
education, relative to those of lower levels of qualification, resulting in a greater wage 
premium per unit labour input, and a partial reduction of employer control over wage setting 
(ibid: 25). The specific nature of this adaptability has been elaborated in the Irish context by 
Ó’ Riain (2000), who has observed that such flexible, skilled labour was typically 
complemented with extensive, informal employee networking, and a wage premium which 
often exceeded the boundaries of typical national wage agreements. Furthermore, the short 
tenure of much highly-skilled software work has led to an individualistic model of high 
employee turnover, which intensifies wage inflation amongst employers seeking to retain 
skilled individuals (Ó’ Riain 2000: 182). These conditions, particularly during periods of 
growth, have led to tensions between workers restrained by national wage agreements, and 
also to the proliferation of low-wage service work as higher-skilled occupations began to 
displace domestic low-wage employment, leading to a shortfall in service sector employment. 
Consequently, growth in the intensity of service export activity in these sectors should exert a 
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positive influence on labour share by boosting employee compensation in line with 
productivity. This polarisation of low and high-skilled pursuits has recently been affirmed by 
the ILO (2013), who have observed a 10% fall in the labour share of unskilled European 
workers, and an increase of up to 8% for high-skilled workers. 
 
Finally, a measure of change in the consumer price index (cpi) is included both for theoretical 
and statistical purposes. Including a measure of inflation or GDP growth has become 
commonplace in time series modeling of labour share, in order to control for the potential 
presence of business cycle effects in the generation of labour share fluctuations; the 
coefficient on this variable acting as an indicator of cyclical or counter-cyclical tendencies in 
labour share movement (Harrison 2005: 26). At a more practical level, other have tested the 
‘wage-lag’ hypothesis with consumer price index data in the context of labour share 
modeling, a hypothesis which suggests that ‘...compensation lags behind productivity over the 
business cycle...change in total compensation lags behind change in net revenue in response 
to cyclical variations in prices and output...therefore labor’s income share decreases with 
increases in inflation rates and output growth’ (Raffalovich et al 1992: 255). This prediction is 
closely related to the presence of crises of effective demand, in which accumulated produce 
leads to falling profit rates (ibid: 245), suggesting that the direction of association between 
inflation and labour share should vary across contexts with differing demand and 
compensation dynamics. Diwan (2001) has suggested another mechanism of association 
between inflation as a ‘financial crisis’ measure of depleted domestic currency stocks, 
although such an interpretation would arguably call for a parallel control on the moderating 
effects of domestic responses. In an exercise in the predictive capacities of labour share, 
Batini et al (2000) discovered that growth in U.K. labour share from 1995 did not result in 
increased inflation, due to compensation from falling import prices. Inclusion of the cpi 
parameter thus controls for the potential presence of this range of cyclical effects, which 
should be expected within a model containing measures both of structural labour market 
adjustment, and international trade exposure.  
 
 
 3. Labour market 
 
 
In addition to specifying two core models of political-economic and macroeconomic sources 
of variation, we include a model to examine the effects of labour market change, through a 
number of theoretically relevant predictors capturing core trends in the composition of the 
workforce, and working conditions. In light of the trends associated with increased 
international trade, labour market deregulation and globalisation, coupled with trends toward 
domestic workforce up-skilling and expanded service sector employment, migration (mig) 
has played a key role within many European states in filling the shortfall within low-skilled 
occupations. Similarly, female labour force participation (femlp), which has expanded 
significantly in recent decades across both Ireland and Denmark, has typically been associated 
with accession to lower paid, lower-skilled jobs, with lower levels of union engagement often 
due to the part-time nature of such occupations (Visser 2006). The effect of both variables is 
not necessarily linear over time however; although female accession has typically been 
associated with wage depression and downward wage pressure within lower-skilled 
occupations, greater levels of participation have tended to narrow the skill gap between 
genders, particularly in states with high public sector employment which has facilitated the 
movement of females into more secure forms of employment (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). 
Regarding the experience of work, average working hours have fallen consistently across 
16 
 
many states over previous decades, reflecting not only union capacity for negotiation around 
working conditions beyond compensation, but also the centralisation of time-setting under 
Europe-wide conventions, albeit with considerable variation across states in terms of statutory 
limitations, collective agreements on working week duration, and overtime (Rubery et al 
1998). The inclusion of average hours worked per year (hours) thus adds a further dimension 
to the productivity-wage lag story, insofar as the capacity to extract increased returns per unit 
input reflects not only a change in employee work intensity, but the application of capital-
augmenting technology which has increased output relative to per-capita working time 
reductions. Working time regimes have not converged on a homogeneous model across 
Europe however, as Ciccia and Ó’ Riain’s (2013) latent class analysis of working time 
arrangements has shown considerable variation in the presence of standard, flexible, 
fragmented and rigid models of working time across Europe. According to their results, the 
regime of standard working time – in which working schedules are typically rigid, fixed by 
employers, and in which clear boundaries between work and private life are set – accounts for 
35% of the overall distribution of working time within Ireland, and 40% in Denmark. 
Furthermore within countries, clear divisions have emerged along gender and class lines 
concerning the distribution of working hours, and work-life balance. As a result, working time 
trends represent not merely a reduction of net working hours within ‘standard working week’ 
arrangements, but an increase of fragmentation and flexibilisation around working time 
(Rubery et al 1998: 99). The evolution of working hours thus captures the emergence of 
heterogeneous working time arrangements across member states, as a critical component of 
overall labour market change. 
 
Similarly, the effects of unemployment (unemp) should present as contingent on the nature of 
specific economies. Much commentary abounds on the role of skills as a differentiating axis 
within the varieties of capitalism literature, according to which various states residing along 
the liberal-coordinated continuum tend to favour the acquisition and provision of more, or less 
specific skills through education (Ebbinghaus and Mannow 2001). Amongst economies in 
which the incentive structure is geared toward the acquisition of general skills in order to 
augment and capitalise on labour market flexibility, the acquisition of specific skills can, in 
cases of labor market reconfiguration, lead to long-term unemployment, or decreased 
employability (Daudey and Decreuse 2006). Furthermore, employment interacts with other 
conditions of globalisation such as product market deregulation, in which case the dynamics 
of global import substitution, international wage competition, and the presence of footloose 
multinationals may conspire to weaken the capacity of labour to achieve higher returns in 
times of uncertainty (Kristal 2010). Irrespective of skill profile, the classical Marxian ‘reserve 
army’ hypothesis implies that a labour surplus during times of economic downturn should 
weaken the bargaining capacities of labour, in which case unemployment should exert a 
downward pressure on labour share in the absence of labour hoarding. This outcome is likely 
to vary however, depending on the nature of domestic welfare provision, the extent and level 
of unemployment benefit, and the scope for long term up-skilling within flexible labour 
markets. The ‘reserve army’ hypothesis further reveals a curious feature of the European 
labour share transition, insofar as it posits a falling rate of profit through labour market 
tightening and upward wage pressure in times of expansion (Raffalovich et al 1992: 244). 
That this has not been the experience of many states is further suggestive of the validity of an 
institutional perspective, and the shortcomings of a factor share stability assumption in growth 
modeling; the inclusion of a model of labour market conditions is thus essential in order to 
explore how the specific features of labour market structure and organisation interact with 
labour share, in both the short and long term.  
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 4. Financialisation 
 
 
Our final model captures a key trend which has received much academic attention of late; the 
growing centrality of financial activities such as financial sector employment and 
profitability, the expansion of consumer credit, capital flow deregulation, the diversification 
of firm activity away from core productive activities, and an increase in ‘shareholder 
managerialism’ at firm-level – processes collectively referred to as financialisation (de Serres 
et al 2002; Krippner 2011; Kus 2012; Ó’ Riain 2012). Krippner’s account of financialisation 
in the U.S. has drawn attention to a number of characteristic trends associated with 
finacialisation, such as an increase in corporate profitability through financial channels, and 
the subsidisation of firm profitability through peripheral financial activities at the expense of 
core, labour-intensive activities (2011: 28). The high capital intensity and productivity of such 
activities, despite the substantial compensation packages associated with high-skilled 
financial sector employment, has led to an overall depression of labour share within these 
sectors, producing a depressive effect on aggregate labour shares (Atkinson 2009). This effect 
has been particularly notable in Germany and the United States, where labour shares in 
finance, insurance and real estate in 1995 stood at 30.3%, and 42% respectively; below 
national average labour shares, and the lowest of all sectors relative to human capital inputs 
(de Serres et al 2002). Ireland and Denmark have both seen substantial growth in their 
financial services sectors between 1995 and 2005. For Ireland, gross operating surplus within 
finance rose from 22.9% of all sectors to 36.5%, finally outstripping manufacturing 
productivity in 2003, and gross value added as a percentage of all sectors, in 2005. 
Productivity in Danish financial services has consistently remained above that of 
manufacturing, whilst its labour share remains the lowest of all sectors (see appendices 2 and 
3). 
 
Financialisation has been conceptualised in a number of ways. As stated previously, the work 
of Kus has revealed a negative association between financialisation (indexed as stock market 
activity, pre-tax bank income and securities), and income inequality, although certain 
problems surround the use of GINI as an appropriate measure of income concentration, given 
that the primary effect of financialisation on inter-sectoral differentials has been for senior pay 
to outstrip that of others of comparable skill levels, owing to the use of non-indexed 
performance bonuses, and the provision of stock options as components of overall 
compensation packages (de Serres et al 2002). Arguably, an index of top-tier income 
concentration across sectors would capture the concentration effects of delinked pay 
increases, and perhaps reconcile the conundrum of Ireland’s modest reductions in net GINI 
between 1980 and 2007, comparable only to those of Sweden (Kus 2012: 480). For Ireland, 
financialisation has led to changes in regulatory governance, partly as a result of increased 
European integration and trade liberalisation, but crucially as a result of regulatory decisions 
taken by the Irish government throughout the 1990’s, which weakened the ability of the state 
to intervene in capital allocation (Ó’ Riain 2012: 500). The translation of investment 
rationalities away from productive investment streams toward speculative property lending, 
coupled with reductions in capital gains tax, gave rise to a situation where growth 
mechanisms driven by finance began to supplant those of Ireland’s 1990’s export-led boom of 
employment and expanded consumption. Property investment thus increased 66% between 
2000 and 2008, whilst investment in productive capital stock by private firms increased 26% 
(Ó’ Riain 2012: 507). The resultant collapse of the property market in 2007, and the effects of 
the global financial crisis reconciles sharply with the finding of much research into the 
detrimental relationship between labour share, and capital account openness, globalisation and 
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capital flow deregulation (Boggio et al 2009; Guscina 2006; Harrison 2005). More 
insidiously, Diwan (2001) has suggested that profound decreases in labour share during times 
of financial crisis suggest the presence of unequal risk sharing, by which losses become 
socialised onto increasingly precarious labour market actors, or though mechanisms of state 
redistribution in times of austerity. 
 
Regarding the more general behaviour of firms, financialisation has also left its imprint upon 
corporate strategising, with profound implications for long-term labour security. With 
growing marketisation of firms, and increased demands of product and capital markets, 
managers have become more sensitised to market signals and short-term profiteering to the 
benefit of shareholder dividends. As a result, market signals come to dominate rationalisation 
decisions; in a climate of easy capital movement, production outsourcing and competitive 
relocation costs, the balance of bargaining power has shifted toward capital. The international 
labour organisation (ILO) has now come to recognise the implications of financialisation on 
labour share, noting that an increase in firm investment options beyond real assets, and the 
effect of ‘aggressive returns-oriented institutions...put[ting] pressure on firms to increase 
profits, especially in the short term’ (ILO 2013: 50). The dimensions of finance and 
finance_wage, coupled with controls for key elements of associated socio-economic change 
(sectoral effect), capture both the comparative economic importance of finance relative to 
other sectors of the national economy, and of the growth of domestic credit as a catalyst for 
expanded consumption. Through these channels, we should expect, on the basis of cross-
national research, that financial activities have come to mediate more widely between firm 
and labour (Thompson 2003), and to depress labour’s share through a range of multilevel 
mechanisms. 
 
 
 2.3. Axes of cross-national comparison 
 
 
The preceding commentary has drawn repeated attention to the possibility of cross national 
variation in the direction of association, effect size, and mechanisms through which these 
dimensions may influence movements in labour share. Many of these variables relate to key 
aspects of labour market institutions such as union activity and leftist power, or core 
characteristics of national economies such as their employment composition, trade and 
investment volumes, and modes of welfare provision. Accordingly, it is worth considering the 
utility of a number of conceptual devices introduced at the opening of this paper, which have 
attempted to marshall this complexity into sets of coherent ideal-typical models, in order to 
better articulate the essential axes of variability along which differences in labour share 
dynamics might manifest across countries. Such devices offer scope for abstraction beyond 
the niceties of individual variables, although their utility here resides within their capacity to 
meaningfully distinguish between observed divergences in parameter values, rather than their 
internal theoretical consistency. 
 
Ireland and Denmark are well differentiated along the respective axes of the varieties of 
capitalism (VOC) and worlds of welfare capitalism typologies (Arts and Gelissen 2002; 
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003; Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2004). 
Esping Anderson’s paradigmatic models of welfare state regimes owe their differentiation to a 
complex of systematically interwoven legal and organisational features, manifesting as 
coherent ideal types within the path-dependent historical trajectories of individual states. 
According to this typology, states may be differentiated by the extent to which their welfare 
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provision is decommodified (i.e. the ability of citizens to subsist beyond reliance upon market 
mechanisms), and by the forms of stratification (i.e. narrow or broad-reaching) engendered by 
internal class coalitions. For liberal economies such as Ireland, markets assume primacy, with 
state subsidised, means-tested welfare provision, and low income redistribution. Social 
democrats such as Denmark, in contrast, exhibit high degrees of decommodification, with a 
universal approach to redistributive welfare provision (Arts and Gelissen 2002). These ideal 
types in turn capture essential features of the welfare - labour market nexus, which bear close 
affinities with other aspects of individual societies such as their domestic production regimes, 
and patterns of inequality (Ebinghaus and Manow 2001).  
 
The VOC perspective extends this configurational logic to a typology of institutional 
variations centered on the extent of coordination in the realms of corporate governance, and 
labour relations (Hall and Gingerich 2004). This perspective operates from a base assumption 
of socially embedded economic activity, within an institutional architecture of legal 
conventions, education and training provision, and the extent of economic coordination, 
which together generate its core binary of; (1) coordinated economies, loosely characterised 
by inter-firm networking, coordinated, centralised wage bargaining, ‘patient’ capital 
investment, vocational training and longer tenures, and (2) liberal market economies, 
characterised by reliance on short-term financing, decentralised wage bargaining, general 
education geared toward flexible labour markets, and higher employee turnover (Ebbinghaus 
and Manow 2001). Within the realms of industrial relations and welfare provision, the VOC 
perspective draws specific attention to the organisation of relations between labour unions and 
employers, and the extent of their connections to the welfare state (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 
16-17). Hall and Gingerich’s (2004) scatterplot of country-level factor loadings on 
coordination in labour relations (level of wage coordination, degree of union-employer 
strategising and labour turnover), and corporate governance (shareholder power over firms, 
dispersion of control and size of stock market), identifies Ireland as a state with low levels of 
coordination in both labour relations and corporate governance, whilst Denmark scores 
comparatively higher on both dimensions (see figure 4 below). Similarly, Blanchard and 
Giavazzi’s (2003) plot of state locations in terms of labour and product market deregulation 
places Ireland at a comparatively lower level of product market regulation (see figure 5 
below).  
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Figure 4. Coordination in labour relations and corporate governance (Hall and 
Gingerich 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Labour and product market deregulation (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003) 
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These axes of differentiation are central to the labour share story in a number of respects. 
Within states exhibiting deregulation in product and labour markets, ease of market entry has 
been shown to exert downward wage pressure on incumbent firms, under the influence of 
foreign direct investment, and trade liberalisation (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). The VOC 
perspective suggests that the centralisation and coordination of wage bargaining should foster 
cross-sectoral solidarities, depress inter-sectoral wage differentials, and favour an overall 
equalisation of pay when the benefits of centrally-negotiated sectoral agreements are spread 
amongst all labourers (i.e. union and non-union). The trade-off of higher union premiums in 
liberal market economies with lower levels of unionisation thus comes with added risk, in the 
form of greater tenurial insecurity (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). The spread of entitlements 
and protections in states with higher union densities should in turn lead to greater labour 
market security, whilst their vocational training orientation should favour long-term up-
skilling, and longer tenures. Within sectors, joint bargaining should favour internal wage 
equalisation, which in turn benefits both high and low earners, providing a further bulwark 
against market perturbation.  
 
Regarding models of welfare capitalism, amongst social democrats with historically greater 
levels of public spending, public employment, and social transfers; wage equalisation effects 
should be evident through the maintenance of reservation wage levels. Universal benefits 
should further insulate employees from adjustment costs in times of economic downturn, 
whilst their greater levels of unionisation should proportionally raise firing costs above those 
of their liberal counterparts. In this respect, the ‘Ghent’ system of unemployment assistance 
provision in Denmark (Ebbinghaus et al 2011; Van Rie et al 2011) has established 
consistently high levels of unionisation, by indexing unemployment benefit rates (up to 90% 
of previous pay levels), under sectoral systems of state subsidised union administration. This 
system has contributed to comparatively high levels of unionisation amongst Nordic states, 
given that access to such funds is typically conditional on minimum contribution periods of 
one or more years (Visser 2006). The ‘Ghent’ system has thus served to mitigate the effects of 
precarious employment which, in conjunction with sustained public spending, has led to 
enhanced labour market participation, particularly amongst cohorts generally associated with 
occupations of shorter tenure, lower levels of unionisation, and lower wages such as females 
(Ebbinghaus et al 2011: 111).  
 
In short, both axes imply a distinction in the capacities of the state, and of labour market 
participants to insulate themselves from the competitive pressures of globalisation, structural 
change, and inter-firm competition. The institutional configurations described by these 
heuristics thus sensitise us to the manner in which states and labour may collectively respond 
to the range of perceived depressive threats detailed in the preceding section, either through 
the conventional bargaining mechanisms of labour market institutions, or through the 
availability of state provisions geared toward cushioning the negative effects of increased 
market exposure. Consequently, both axes suggest a distinction between Ireland and 
Denmark, in terms of the capacities of state and labour market institutions to distribute 
economic gains equitably amongst capital and labour, and to support sustainable growth. 
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3. Data and Methods 
 
 
 3.1. Measuring labour’s share of national income 
 
 
The calculation of labour’s share of income is far from a matter of consensus, and existing 
literature exhibits a number of competing methods of estimation. Owing to difficulties in 
distinguishing capital from labour allocation amongst the self-employed within national 
accounts measures of compensation, it has become customary to include a correction for 
incomes of the self-employed, typically assumed to reside at the average rate of compensation 
of either the sectoral, or national workforce. This ‘adjusted’ measure assumes equivalence 
between wages of the self-employed and employees. There is considerable evidence however, 
that sectoral inequalities in proportions of self-employment and remuneration may produce an 
under-estimate of aggregate labour share levels, particularly as in recent years, self-
employment growth has tended toward those in high-income professions, rather than within 
sectors of traditionally lower remuneration such as agriculture (Arpaia, Perez and Pichelmann 
2009; De Serres et al 2002). Others such as Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) have taken a more 
cursory approach, calculating labour share simply as compensation of employees/gross value 
added, without adjustments for the self-employed wage bill. Both approaches engender related 
difficulties – especially in the cases of Ireland and Denmark - insofar as both employ Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Value Added (GVA) as their respective denominators. 
This introduces a significant source of error into the estimate, as Ireland’s economic fortunes 
are characterised, in part, by their volatility to global vicissitudes, and uneven periods of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. This is particularly true of the late 1980’s and 1990’s, 
throughout which Ireland began to capitalise on a new wave of FDI, to the extent that between 
1991 and 1999, industrial employment in U.S. owned manufacturing plants grew by 91.7%, 
whilst the professional industrial labour force grew by 124% (O’ Riain 2004: 31).  
 
Ireland’s various historical phases of protectionist industrial policy and regimes of FDI-led 
growth, punctuated by sustained periods of recession, further render the calculation of national 
output difficult, due to the strong influence of multinationals on its GDP base. The presence of 
favourable corporate tax rates such as Ireland’s have proven particularly attractive to foreign 
multinationals seeking to maximise corporate profit, and in the context of U.S. owned 
subsidiaries, existing research has suggested that the presence of such affiliates in countries of 
lower corporate tax regimes results in a favourable outcome of lower tax liabilities for U.S.-
based parent companies, given that foreign profits are liable for taxation only upon 
repatriation (Barry 2005; Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003). As a result, the transfer pricing 
activities of foreign-owned firms tend to produce the undesirable effect, from the perspective 
of labour share calculation, of artificially inflating estimates of the domestic returns to capital, 
in the form of inflated estimates of national product (Stewart 1989). As a case in point, the 
Irish pharmaceutical sector is especially prone to such confounding. Given that this FDI-
dominated sector accounted for approximately 16% of Irish industrial exports in 2006, and 
that 93% of Irish pharmaceutical employment was accounted for by foreign-owned 
companies, it is worth noting that gross value added per capita in Irish pharmaceuticals at this 
time was more than double the EU-15 average, a rate which is suggestive of extensive transfer 
pricing activity (van Egeraat and Barry 2009: 28). The effect of this distortion extends beyond 
pharmaceuticals; the ‘reproduction of computer media’ sector, which captures the output of 
Ireland’s extensive, globalised software industry, exhibits a GVA per employee five times that 
of the UK (Barry 2005: 677). The net effect of these transfer price manipulations is that of a 
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considerable mismatch between domestically generated, and domestically appropriated value. 
The scale of this mismatch across both Ireland, and to a lesser extent, Denmark, may be 
further illustrated by graphing GNI as a proportion of GDP across the EU-27; 
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Figure 6. Ratios of GNI-GDP, EU-27 
 
 
Table 1. GNI/GDP ratio outliers 
Country GNI/GDP Ratio 
Luxembourg 82.215 
Lithuania 82.930 
Ireland 85.538 
Denmark 110.058 
United Kingdom 110.59 
Latvia 110.947 
 
 
As may be observed above, although GNI-GDP ratios exhibit broad parity across a majority of 
countries, a number of outliers exist for which GDP constitutes a considerable over-estimation 
of domestic capital returns (the lower-bound outliers of Ireland, Lithuania and Luxembourg). 
On the basis of the above disparity, this paper employs an estimate of aggregate labour share 
utilising GNI as its denominator, in order to adjust for the considerable contribution of 
multinationals and foreign-owned subsidiaries to productivity statistics, thereby offering a 
crucial corrective to existing studies which have relied on a GDP-denominator in their 
calculation of Ireland’s labour share. The net effect of this adjustment is an inflation and 
stabilisation of post-1980 labour share rates in Ireland, and a more consistent, moderate 
reduction in those of Denmark. Despite the computational precision offered by a sectoral 
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decomposition approach, which offers a weighted estimate based upon the specific character 
of self-employed remuneration by sector, reliable sectoral data are available from 1970 only 
for Ireland, which reduces substantially the degrees of freedom possible in sector-aggregated 
models. Therefore, labour shares were calculated according to the formula reproduced below, 
which further permits a consideration of potential historical shifts between rates of formal-
contractual, and self-employment in the national economy, albeit one which is based on 
aggregate national accounts data from 1960-2010. The net effect of this adjustment is that of a 
more modest rate of labour share decline across the historical span of the Irish series relative 
to that of Kristal (2010), and a marginally greater overall Irish average (63.9%) than that of 
the European Commission (2007), which has estimated Ireland’s average labour share at 
62.1%. Sectorally-decomposed series of shorter duration were also calculated for Ireland and 
Denmark utilising EU-KLEMS, and OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) data, which offer a 
decomposition of economy-wide labour shares to ISIC Rev. 3 sectors between 1970 and 2010 
(see appendices 5 and 6). The results of adjusting the Irish and Danish aggregate series to a 
GNI denominator are illustrated below in figures 7 and 8, which graphs both GDP and GNI 
estimates between 1960 and 2011. As may be observed, both sets of estimates exhibit broad 
parity until the 1980’s after which Ireland’s expanding, globalised productive base begins to 
significantly underestimate returns to labour based on GDP alone.  
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Figure 7. Labour’s share of national income (Ireland), GDP and GNI denominator, 
1960-2012 
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Figure  8. Labour’s share of national income (Denmark), GDP and GNI denominator, 
1960-2012 
 
 
Furthermore, as may be observed in figure 9 below, both Ireland and Denmark exhibit 
competing phases of labour share decline, indicating substantial differentiation in their 
aggregate dynamics. By regressing and plotting a succession of period-specific trend 
dummies, we may gauge this divergence in adjustment rates across Ireland and Denmark; the 
coefficient on these partial models indicates the average amount (%) reduction over 1 year 
within each period (i.e. 1984-1994). Whilst Ireland exhibits faster growth between 1960 and 
1980, Denmark adjusts consistently toward a more stable rate of decline relative to that of 
Ireland which drops to -1.5% per year between 1994 and 2001, compared to -.4% per year for 
Denmark. Overall, Denmark’s series is more trend-stationary relative to Ireland which is 
decidedly more volatile, suggesting an imminent need for closer attention to the dimensions 
articulated in the previous section. 
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Figure 9. Period-specific linear trend coefficients, 1960-2010 
 
 
Commensurate with substantive and theoretical requirements, and insights gleaned from 
papers cited throughout, a range of independent variables were selected for inclusion in the 
time-series models which follow. Single-unit time series analyses, particualrly those 
conducted on series measured over long intervals such as years, typically suffer from the 
problem of diminished sample size and reduced degrees of freedom, rendering the reliable 
inclusion of multiple predictors in a single model somewhat problematic. Consequently, an 
iterative approach to model specification was taken, by which a range of alternate models 
were specified corresponding to differing components of the nationally-bounded system of 
institutional and macroeconomic configurations in which the dynamics of labour share 
manifest. These models were in turn specified according to the criteria outlined in figure 3. 
Descriptive statistics and descriptions of all input variables are provided in appendix 1, along 
with details of variable sources 
 
 
 3.2. Model Estimation 
 
 
A multitude of existing studies have employed various forms of data pooling, in order to 
assess both cross-sectional variations in labour share and income inequality between countries, 
and to explore the determinants of income distribution inequality over time. Investigations of 
income and labour share distribution over time often utilise pooled observations across 
multiple countries, in order to maximise sample sizes for panel estimation techniques, and to 
recover degrees of freedom, thus permitting the inclusion of more predictors than is typically 
possible with single-unit time series models (Kristal 2010; Jaumotte and Tytell 2007; Lee 
2005; Rodriguez and Jayadev 2010; Volscho and Kelly 2012). Such studies have not been 
received without a measure of criticism however. In a meta-review of 195 published studies 
employing linear panel models, Wilson and Butler (2007) found that 22.1% included no 
dynamics, and that 93.1% offered no discussion of their author’s decisions either to include or 
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excluse dynamic specifications. Furthermore, upon re-specifying 20 models from their chosen 
pool of published works with varying alternative specifications, such as the inclusion of unit 
fixed effects, the authors identified 8 sets of estimates in which coefficients subsequently 
varied in magnitude from those of their original investigators, and 5 sets of data where 
coefficients reversed sign (Wilson and Butler 2007: 113). This does not imply a default 
rejection of the explanatory capacities of pooled analyses, but instead calls for a sensitivity on 
the part of the analyst both to the particular method of model specification employed, and 
indeed, to the very logic of pooling itself.  
 
In light of these caveats, there are a number of reasons why a single-case approach is here 
mandated. As discussed above, Ireland – and to a lesser extent, Denmark - sit somewhat 
problematically within existing meta-regimes of socio-economic differntiation, such as those 
of the influential varieties of capitalism, and worlds of welfare capitalism. Consequently, 
despite its decidedly liberal categorisation by Hall and Gingerich (2004) based on comparative 
economic coordination scores, existing studies have emphasised the punctuation of Ireland’s 
liberal trajectory with profound periods of state intervention, such as its participation in social 
paternership negotiations, which reached beyond issues of wage setting alone to incorporate 
civic associations with implicit agendas of social inclusion (Teague 2006), and the actions of 
the Irish ‘developmental network state’, which mobilised a range of state institutions and 
mechanisms throughout the 1990’s, such as creation of state industrial development agencies 
and the setting of corporate taxation rates, fostering an influx of foreign capital (O’ Riain 
2009). In light of such possible deviations from the typical prescriptions of liberalism of social 
democracy – such as Denmark’s ‘workfare turn’ in the late 1990’s, a specific consideration of 
the evolving institutional space of econonomic activity is thus central to any interpretation of 
the dynamics of its returns to labour. To this end, the historical scope of the data employed in 
these analyses incorporate a number of distinct, characteristic phases of economic 
development, regimes of industrial policy formulation, and trends of unionisation. 
 
The nature of time series regression thus satisfies a number of related methodological 
concerns. In purely statistical terms, it satisfies the core requirements of data reduction, albeit 
with certain limits on the number of potential independent variables, owing to a reduction in 
degrees of freedom in consequence of the small sample sizes typically available in single-unit 
time series. However, time-series analysis, in contrast to typical cross-sectional quantitative 
work, permits a form of ‘case-intensive’ investigation, which calls for sensitivity to historical 
nuance both in terms of model specification and interpretation. Time series techniques also 
permit the partailing of specific historical phases through the inclusion of trend dummies, 
which allow for the presentation of historical nuances in model coefficients. The specific  
modelling technique employed in the forthcoming analysis consists of a series of error 
correction models (ECM), employing both ordinary least squares, and autoregressive error 
estimators. ECM’s are here employed in an attempt to deal with a number of issues which 
render the specification of time series models somewhat problematic, those of error 
autocorrelation, and non-stationarity, which are here discussed in turn. 
 
In contrast to regressions performed on cross-sectional data, time series models are particualry 
prone to spuriousness due to the probable presence of error autocorrelation. Given that time-
series data points possess an inherently ordered structure, positive residuals in a particular 
period are likely to be associated with positive residuals across subsequent periods (and 
similarly with negative residuals). This characteristic violates a core assumption of the linear 
model; that of zero covariance between errors. Consequently, parameter estimates in time-
series models suffer from an underestimation of variance, which tends to inflate t-statistics due 
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to the presence of smaller denominators (standard errors). The net effect of this variance 
underestimation is an upward bias of t, leading to an increased probability of type-1 errors 
when assessing coefficient significance. Error autocorrelation is typically dealt with through 
the inclusion of dynamics, such as the regression of lags of independent variables on the 
outcome in question, or the use of a family of models known as autoregressive error models 
(ARp), which estimate two sets of equations in which the autocorrelative structure is 
contained within a separate error equation, and the structural equation may be interpreted as a 
‘steady state’ equation. These problems are dealt with in the context of the error correction 
model specification (ECM) detailed below. 
 
 
 3.3. Stationarity and unit root tests 
 
 
Time-series models are particularly prone to confounding from the property of series non-
stationarity. A time-series is deemed stationary is it is mean-reverting (i.e. although the series 
may fluctuate over time, it should remain stable around its mean value). Social-scientific data 
are especially prone to shock-persistence and trending behaviour however, and the above time 
series plots suggest that such characteristics are present in many of our chosen predictors. 
Regressions employing non-stationary series can result in high R
2
 and F statistics, or in a 
spurious regression which falsely detects significant relationships between unrelated series. In 
practice it is difficult to diagnose non-stationarity visually, and unit root tests should be 
employed as a first-pass prior to model fitting. Furthermore, given that many of the following 
variables are expressed as proportions, the simple fact of their constraint by upper bounds, and 
therefore the absence of theoretically infinite variance, implies that such variables cannot meet 
the criteria of infinite variance required of unit root processes (Volscho and Kelly 2012: 696). 
Conscious of the questionable validity of regressions conducted on non-stationary variables 
(Ercolani and Wei 2011), stationarity tests were performed on all variables implicated in the 
forthcoming analysis; appendix 2 therefore presents the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests. On the basis of these results, it is clear that non-stationarity is a 
significant source of concern in our analysis, and the provisions of the ECM, as detailed 
below, are further justified. 
 
 
 3.4. The error-correction model 
 
 
Conventional approaches to the combined problems of serial correlation and non-stationarity 
in time series regression often seek to specify various forms of the finite distributed lag model 
(FDL), in which lags of stationary predictors, and first-differenced non-stationary predictors 
are combined in a multivariate model of the following general form; 
 
 
 
 
In this model, levels of labour share ( ) are modelled as a function of first differences ( ), 
and lags of predictors ( ), according to their specific orders of integration. The type of 
relationship typically observed in analyses of income distribution however, is that of an error 
correction relationship, in which ‘...deviations from the long-run relationship (errors) are 
eliminated over time through an adjustment process (error corrections)’ (Volscho and Kelly 
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2012: 688). As noted above, regressions performed on non-stationary series run the risk of 
arriving at a spurious model which yields significant coefficients, when in fact no relationship 
exists. Under certain circumstances in regressions amongst non-stationary series that are 
related, a desirable property known as super-consistency is produced, which yields faster 
convergence to true parameter values. Typically, the presence of cointegration may be 
assessed by testing the stationarity of residuals from a regression between two or more non-
stationary series; if the residuals of this model are themselves non-stationary, then the 
regression may be deemed super-consistent, and the desirable properties of convergence to 
true parameter values may be exploited. The use of ECM’s however, permits a more 
parsimonious mode of assessment. A single equation ECM consists of an autoregressive 
independent variable ( ), and a series of additional predictors which model both short 
term effects, and long-term effects. In this case, a ‘first differenced’ term captures the short 
term, instantaneous effects of changes in the level of predictors ( ), whilst a lagged 
term captures the long-run effect ( ). The complete model includes a first-differenced 
outcome ( ) as follows; 
 
 
 
 
 
The parameter on the autoregressive term thus serves as a test of cointegration in the 
presence of integrated variables (the above unit root diagnostics indicate orders of integration 
are present across all variables), whereby a significant coefficient indicates the presence of a 
long-run relationship between variables (de Serres 2002; Volscho and Kelly 2012). 
Furthermore, this parameter may be interpreted as the proportion of disturbance, generated by 
changes in the predictors, which is corrected within a single year. Consequently, the above 
specification offers the considerable advantage of permitting the incorporation of both short 
and long-term effects (Busemeyer 2009; Kristal 2010: 744), as well as providing a diagnostic 
of the potential presence of cointegration, and a parsimonious summary of the system 
dynamics. With regard to the mechanics of model estimation, a ‘Box-Jenkins’ approach was 
adopted, which involves beginning with a parsimonious model containing a limited number of 
explanatory variables, and progressively adding and removing variables based both on 
theoretical, and statistical criteria (i.e. t-statistic magnitude). This procedure continued 
iteratively for each individual model, until a point of saturation, or diminishing returns was 
reached, the threshold of which was judged on the basis of information criteria (AIC) and 
parameter significance. Parameters on models 3 and 4 were were chosen based both on their 
coefficient magnitude across previous models, and their theoretical relevance; all models were 
estimated by ordinary least squares, with robust standard errors, and constructed according to 
the same essential ECM structure as detailed in the above equation. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
 
Ireland and Denmark exhibit a number of key institutional and structural differences, as 
detailed in appendices 3-5 which list summary trends in aggregate and sectoral labour shares, 
employment, and sectoral output. Certain of these trends, although less explicit, are of subtle 
importance to the labour share narrative.  The voltility of Ireland’s labour share relative to that 
of Denmark is borne out by the fact that Ireland’s series exhibits second-order integration in 
its unit root diagnostics, whilst that of Denmark is first-order integrated. Visually, aggregate 
labour share trends are similarly divergent; although exhibiting comparable variation until the 
early 1980’s – albeit at differing relative levels – Ireland’s post-1980’s decline is significantly 
sharper, eventually dipping below that of Denmark in the late 1990’s, before rising sharply 
following the post-2007 collapse in Irish GDP (ax3, 1). This is despite similar historical 
trends in the sectoral employment compositions of both economies. Ireland has witnessed a 
profound transition in its employment structure since 1960, during which agricultural 
employment has fallen drastically, relative to moderate declines in industry and 
manufacturing, and a drastic rise in services employment. By 2009, service sector 
employment, including public sector and retail, accounted for 75% of total Irish employment, 
with particular gains in financial and business services (ax4, 12). Similarly, Denmark has seen 
a sustained decline in manufacturing relative to total employment, a comparably drastic rise in 
service sector employment to a level above that of Ireland, coupled with modest declines in 
agricultre, and substantial gains in financial and business services (ax5, 11). 
 
In terms of economic output and productivity, service sector growth  in Ireland has led to a 
simialr consolidation of services output in terms of economy-wide gross value added (ax4, 
13). Concurrently, the relative contribution of agriculture to net value added has declined 
sharply in line with agricultural employment, whilst that of services has grown sharply, 
overtaking manufacturing in the early-mid 2000’s. Despite the low capital intensity of public 
sector activity, service sector output has come to dominate, rising to over half of economy-
wide composition during the 2000’s, assisted in part by the rise of financial sector capital 
intensity. This interpretation is corroborated by sectoral decompositions of productivity, 
which show the dominance of financial services and manufacturing relative to the per-capita 
productivity of other sectors (ax4, 11). When adjusted for the comparative labour-intensity of 
public services, the comparative prominence of service sector activity falls sharply, whilst that 
of mannufacturing – unadjusted for the effects of multinational transfer pricing – assumes 
growing importance. Provisionally, these trends appear to substantiate something of the 
technological augmentation-capital intensity narrative of aggregate labour shares, given that 
Ireland shows significant gains in per-capita output in manufacturing during the ‘techological 
revolution’ era of the post 1980’s, coupled with a sharp rise in finance, under the influence of 
deregulated capital movement, and favourable capital gains taxation rates, relative to which 
labour’s share has fallen. 
 
In Denmark, the disparity between service and manufacturing sector output is yet more 
pronounced (ax5, 11). Combined service sector output now accounts for almost 80%  of 
Danish gross value added, relative to which manufacturing and agriculture have experienced 
near-uninterrupted decline. Similarly, financial sector output has risen sharply relative to that 
of the ‘real’ economy, surpassing manufacturing during the 2000’s. The dynamics of Danish 
sectoral change are thus similar to those of Ireland, albeit with more pronounced intra-sectoral 
disparities. These disparities are especially pronounced when examined in productivity terms 
(ax5, 10). Relative to others, per-capita output in finance has outstripped that of all other 
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sectors, suggesting that the Danish economy has undergone a process of financialisation – at 
least in sectoral and output terms – similar to that of Ireland, whereby capital-intensity has 
come to dominate aggregate output dynamics. Denmark defies the classical ‘hump shape’ of 
pan-European productivity and labour share dynamics however, by exhibiting more stable 
upward trends in decomposed manufacturing output during the technological growth era, with 
little evidence of structural breaks pre/post 1980.  
 
Evolving economic composition, in terms of output and productivity, plays a key role in 
labour share variation. The transition to a service economy, coupled with alternating rates of 
growth  and decline in agriculture, manufacturing, construction and finance, suggests that the 
distribution of economy-wide, labour-intensive employment has also fundamentally altered. 
Sectoral decompositions of Ireland’s labour share reveal that aggregate labour share dynamics 
conceal important inequalities, and highly variable extents of capital intensity both within, 
and between sectors (ax4, 10). In sectors exhibiting high rates of self-employment and labour 
intensity such as construction and agriculture, their decline relative to the rise and stability of 
capital-intensive finance and manufacturing implies a concurrent reduction in aggregate 
labour share – a conclusion which appears borne out at least desciptively. For Denmark, a 
similar mix of labour share inequality across sectors presents, albeit with decidedly greater 
labour intensity in manufacturing – partly attributable to the greater influence of fdi-induced 
transfer pricing in Ireland, and greater extents of small-medium enterprises in Denmark – 
along with lower agricultural labour intensity (ax5, 9). Finance, however, exhibits much lower 
labour share levels, insofar as its higher degree of capital intensity - coupled with its overall 
rise in sectoral importance relative to other sectors of the Danish economy - suggests that a 
similar depressive effect on aggregate labour shares should be identifiable in line with a 
classical technological-capital augmentation account. That this has not been the case is 
suggestive of the presence of underlying institutional relationships medating labours returns, 
which appear to generate a comparative stability in the Danish series despite broadly similar 
patterns of structural-economic change across both economies. Table 2 (below) details  the 
results of the first set of ECM models, accounting for political-economic (1) and macro-
economic (2)  sources of variation detailed schematically in figure 3.  
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Table 2. Political-econonic and macro-econonomic models of labour share (OLS) 
 Δ ls (Labour share, GNI denominator) 
 Ireland Denmark 
 1. Political-economic 2. Macro-economic 1. Political-economic 2. Macro-economic 
lst-1 -.599** -.259* -.439** -.704** 
Δ left .032  -.095+  
leftt-1 -.135*  .000  
Δ union .003  .101  
uniont-1 .223*  .142*  
Δ welfare .817  .640*  
welfaret-1 .281  -.302*  
Δ fdi -.069**  -.005  
fdit-1 -.061
+
  -.007  
Δ trade  -5.683  4.964 
tradet-1  -11.534**  13.695** 
Δ service  -.096  .193 
servicet-1  -.570
+
  .142 
Δ comp  .173*  .089* 
compt-1  .176*  .105 
Δ cpi  -.379**  -.002 
cpit-1  .039  .423** 
Constant 25.516** 52.365* 20.499** 14.479 
Adj. R
2 
.5544 .7579 .5864 .7362 
Model F (9, 22) 11.60*** (9, 17) 31.14*** (9, 25) 5.76 (9, 11) 12.90 
AIC 106.1702 92.9647 94.7635 48.42862 
Mean VIF 5.13 13.15 2.19 3.92 
N 32 27 35 21 
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Figure 10. Standardised coefficients, political-economic model (Ireland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Standardised coefficients, political-economic model (Denmark) 
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Consistent with theoretical predictons, the resilience of Denmark’s labour share to underlying 
fluctuations in institutional structure is more profound, and indeed more favourable to labour, 
than in Ireland. The muted long-term effect of unionisation in Denmark is likely attributable 
to its higher base levels of union density; unionisation typically exhibits a threshold effect, 
whereby additional units at higher levels yield little additional returns in compensation – in 
pooled analyses, such effects are typically modeled as a quadratic function using exponential 
terms. Therefore, the above model is likely recording larger potential gains of additional 
union membership, and a more substantial ‘union wage premium’ effect characteristic of 
liberal market economies, in the context of Ireland’s comparatively lower base levels of 
unionisation which exhibit narrower sectoral coverage, low statutory protection, and lesser 
extents of bargaining centralisation than those of Denmark (ax3, 2). Simialrly, the effect of fdi 
approaches zero and is non-significant in the Danish context, whilst that of Ireland is 
significant and negative, owing to Ireland’s greater extents of global trade, and the volatility 
of its exposure to global labour and product market price fluctuations, which profoundly 
influence the domestic strategies of multinationals. The pronounced short-term effect of fdi 
inflow has been verified in existing studies, which have observed stronger effects at earlier 
stages of financial openness (Decreuse and Maarek 2008: 24). Descriptive output further 
corroborates the cyclical, volatile nature of fdi inflows across both contexts, (ax3, 5), 
according to which fdi rises dramatically throughout the 1990’s in Ireland, concurrent with 
substanntial declines in labour share, whereafter it remains mean-reverting for the duration of 
the series. 
 
Leftist partisanship exhibits a negative effect in Ireland, owing to historical difficulties of 
ideological dilution, and the suppression of labour-friendly policy programmes under the 
influence of centre-right coalition formation, which has characterised the largely peripheral 
position of the left in successive Irish administrations. Therefore, this model of partisanship is 
arguably unable to account for the influence of majority leftist cabinets, owing to their 
absence from historical record. Simialrly, the leftist ideological homogeneity of social-
democratic Denmark has likely muted variation along the left-right continuum, producing 
non-significant leftist effects (this higher base level of leftist representation, and lower 
variation may be observed across both Ireland and Denmark in ax3, 3). Provisionally, in line 
with the compensation hypothesis, periods of increased welfare spending precede those of 
increased labour share in Ireland, although the effect does not achieve significance. The long-
term effect of welfare is negative in Denmark, which is perhaps indicative of the stabilisation 
of Denmark’s welfare spending during the 1990’s, and the emergence of more workfare 
orientations, albeit under a national model of universal entitlement (Torfing 1999). 
 
Unionisation, and its interaction with other dimensions of the political-economic sphere 
arguably constitutes a key locus of differentiation between both countries. According to the 
varieties of capitalism perspecitve, union densities and bargaining coverage should result in a 
stabilisation of compensation between sectors, a distinction which is controlled for in the 
specification of parallel models for Ireland and Denmark, based on their separation on labour 
market coordination indices (Hall and Gingerich 2004). In contrast to Denmark where access 
to social protection is tied to union membership, Ireland’s system of voluntary, non-statutory 
recognition affords greater latitude to employers, whilst its regime of fdi-led multinational 
growth has led to a proliferation of employers engaging in avoidance practices. This has been 
particularly pronounced amongst multinationals with the capacity to mobilise intensive H.R. 
systems geared toward opting out of collective bargaining, and through their engagement in 
practices of parallel non-recognition at greenfield sites (Lamare et al 2009; Roche 2001). 
Conversely, the provisions of the Danish Ghent system, despite Denmark’s more pronounced 
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SME industrial structure, have favoured sustained union densities throughout times of high 
unemployment, whist broader bargaining coverage has served to stabilise inter-sectoral 
compensation inequalities relative to structural employment and labour market change 
(Ebbinghaus et al 2011; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Van Rie et al 2011). Opposing structural 
covariates have been found in the Irish context, according to which new-entrant, high-tech, 
U.S.-owned multinationals exhibit a ‘...strong anti-union animus and a general determination 
to assert their preference for remaining non-union in the economic and institutional 
circumstances now prevailing’ (Roche 2001: 52). Therefore, is is not surprising that the long-
term effect of unionisation, in the context of periods of high labour share and high union 
density between 1960 and 1980, should exhibit a strong positive effect in the Irish model. 
 
Ireland’s economic growth of the 1990’s has long been tied to the role of fdi and trade 
liberalisation, given that Ireland is one of the most fdi-intensive economies of Europe. The 
evolution of Ireland’s fdi-led growth regime may be parsed into a number of distinct phases; 
its emergence from protectionism and discarding of restrictions on foreign industrial 
ownership; its elimination of manufactured export tax, consolidating Ireland’s position as an 
intra-European export platform; its integration into the EU common market, and its later 
capitalisation on high-tech multinational investment (Barry 2006). Foreign-owned operations 
typically weild greater influence over work practices than incumbent counterparts, and much 
Irish inward fdi has been concentrated in manufacturing (particularly electronics, and other 
high-tech sub-sectors), and services – particularly financial (O’ Mahony and Barry 2004).  
 
Our meta-analysis of net fdi inflow coefficients across existing research has affirmed a 
negative effect within pooled analyses (see appendix 5). These results contrast sharply with 
those of Denmark however, which despite comparable levels of fdi inflow relative to Ireland 
(ax3, 5), exhibits a negligible coefficient on fdi intensity. Campbell and Pedersen (2007) have 
argued that the Danish economy, in contrast to the rigidities of the varieties of capitalism 
CME model, has devolved into a heterogenous framework of dynamic interactions between 
market, and non-market institutions which has engendered competitive gains contrary to the 
ideal-type institutional convergence mandated by proponents of the VOC approach. It is 
therefore likely that this heterogeneity has afforded considerable latitude in Danish 
institutional structure, in terms of its ability to reflexively respond to the effects of fdi, which 
have not produced levels of multinational residence comparable to those of Ireland (Denmark 
also retains close trading links with its geographical neighbours, compared to Ireland’s global 
exposure as a heirarchically integrated export platform). In terms of flexicurity, employers 
within liberal market economies are typically more responsive in the short term to market 
signals concerning hiring and firing; the lower securities associated with lower union density, 
high fdi and consequent flexibilisation in Ireland are thus mitigated in Denmark with its 
empahsis on generous unemployment compensation and higher labour market activation 
spending which serve to cushion the wage-depressive effects of labour market insecurity 
(Campbell and Pedersen 2007: 317).  
 
By contrast, Ireland’s 1990’s regime of fdi intensification saw the consolidation of foreign-
owned manufacturing, the emergence of spin-off services employment in response to the 
movement of multinational manufacturing to Asia and central Europe, and an augmentation 
of capital gains and corporation tax favourable to financial sector expansion, sectors typically 
identified as significant covariates of non-unionisation (Barry 2006; Ó Riain 2012). The 
relationship between multinational presence and wage dynamics in Denmark is somewhat 
more complex; although unionistion typically engenders wage premiums relative to non-
unionised employment, the union-premium effect is not present amongst Danish foreign-
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owned multinationals. This is despite the presence of a multinational wage premium 
independent of unionisation controls, which is suggestive of diminished bargaining power 
both within foreign-owned enterprises, and at higher union densities (Braun 2008). However, 
Philip Lane (1998) has previously commented on the depressive effects of national wage 
modertion in Ireland under social partnership, according to which workers were less 
advantageously placed to take advantage of rising growth. Concurrently, the flexibilisation 
associated with a globalising labour market within Ireland, although having yielded gains in 
real wages, has led to the emergence of a flexicurity model based on high flexibility, and 
lower security relative to the protections afforded Danish workers within simialr sectors 
(Heyes 2013). This conclusion is thus commensurate with existing accounts of the augmented 
power of footloose multinationals with lower relocation costs, which has tended to 
compromise the bargaining power of labour through traditional industrial action, and wage 
bargaining channels under threat of relocation, resulting in declining labour shares (Choi 
2001; Hutchinson and Persyn 2009). 
 
With regard to welfare, Hardimann et al (2008) have found little evidence for the 
compensation hypothesis in Irish data; in contrast with states such as the Netherlands where 
wage bargains were struck bilaterally with competitiveness-enhancement committments, Irish 
social partnership agreements with lower sectoral coverage traded tax cuts for wage 
moderation, characteristic of  the reactionary, conflict-mediating nature of Irish political 
culture (Hardimann et al 2008). In terms of welfare provision, Ireland’s approach has 
remained similarly reactionary and characteristically liberal, with high reliance on means-
tested income transfers, and the lowest levels of social services investment of the EU-15 
(Kirby 2008). By contrast, Denmark remains one of the highest spenders on active labour 
market programs within the OECD, a feature which facilitates continual upskilling during 
periods of unemployment, and stronger individual labour market competitiveness (Campbell 
and Pendersen 2007: 317).  
 
By contrast, Irish welfare reform has been piecemeal and reactionary, with new measures 
added in an ad-hoc manner in response to emerging needs (Kirby 2008: 24). Furthermore, the 
reliance of Irish welfare funding on regressive sources such as direct goods and services 
taxes, corporation and property tax has left national budgets vulnerable to external shocks 
such as fdi volatility, the effects of which are evident in the dramtic post-2007 spurious 
upsurge in ‘labour share’ following the collapse of Ireland’s GDP in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, and demand slump (ibid: 25). The reactionary nature of Irish welfare 
provision has therefore not served to significantly augment labour share in a manner which 
might favour the establistment of reservation wage mechanisms leading to compensation 
stabilisation (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). The negative coefficient on Danish levels likely 
reflects a stabilisation and decline in its welfare spending levels during periods of moderate 
labour share decline throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s (ax3, 4), during which it adopted a 
strategy of workfare, activation-oriented welfare provision, albeit one detached from the de-
commodified neoliberal underpinnings of the liberal U.S. and U.K. (Torfing 1999). This 
likely accounts for the anomaly of the dual significance of Denmark’s short and long-term 
welfare effects, which have tended to augment compensation stability in the short term during 
periods of economic vulnerability, whilst the state reduced its proportional welfare bill, and 
diversified its provision strategies over the last two decades. Overall, despite such changes in 
the nature of spending and provision, the social democrats have maintained favourable 
national poverty rates, with 12.6% of residents recorded as economically vulnerable, 
compared to 20.3% within the liberal cluster (Whlean and Maitre 2010: 323). 
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Figure 12. Standardised coefficients, macro-economic model (Ireland) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Standardised coefficients, marco-economic model (Denmark) 
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One of the most striking divergences between the Irish and Danish results is the opposing 
direction of the effect of global trade volume, which achieves long-term significance in both 
models. Computationally, we might expect that a substantial proportion of this Irish trade 
volume is subject to transfer pricing inflaton, but the outcome of GNI-estimated labour share 
controls for this potential source of confounding. The opposing trends of globalg trade share 
across both contexts (ax3, 6) further suggest that Ireland has increased its global exposure 
substiatially more than that of Denmark, resulting in greater exposure to international sources 
of risk and instability. The effect of this instability on labour share manifests through a 
number of related channels; a depression of domestic wages through competition from low-
wage competitor countries and cheap input costs – an effect which is especially pronounced 
amongst developing countries where capital output often outstrips stagnant wages already at 
subsistence level -, and an increase in capital output under the increased mobility endowed by 
capital account openness, which raises rents disproportionately (Jayadev 2007). The evolution 
of the Irish  corporate tax regime is exemplary of this tendency, whereby between 1987 and 
1998, taxes on financial profits were cut along with corporate tax rates for all trading 
companies (Barry 2006).  
 
That Ireland’s trade volume has increased relative to Denmark’s decline is equally striking, 
implying a consequent augmentation of bargaining power in the face of tighter product, and 
labour market regulation as suggested by the Danish positive coefficient. The nature of 
Ireland’s greater openness in light of the behaviour of footloose firms is underscored with 
reference to the experience of Dell, which relocated core production overseas in the face of 
uncompetitive production costs, resulting in the emergence of subsidiary jobs of greater skill 
requirements, albeit with less labour-intensity than core manufacturing (Collins and Grimes 
2010). Conversely, uncompetitive foreign labour costs have been noted as positively 
correlated with labour share returns, lending some credence to the mechanism of global 
exposure and comparative relocation costs as a critical source of compromised bargaining 
capacity (Hutchinson and Persyn 2009: 25). Equally, this model reveals that the associated 
proliferation of service sector employment has led to overall labour share depression albeit 
subject to the more positive influence of high-skilled technical employment. Similarly, trade 
exposure interacts with other institutional components to the detriment of unionisation in 
liberal market economies. As O’ Farrell has shown, international competition lowers the 
effect of union premiums, by eliminating union wage premiums relative to the higher wages 
achievable through individual bargaining (2010). As the previous model has demonstrated, 
there exists a key distinction between both countries in terms of the protections afforded 
workers in the labour market; therefore, it is likely that this trade variable is more sensitive to 
depressive fluctuations in domestic conditions, and to the increased sensitivity of Irish firms 
of market signals concerning hiring and firing compared to the insulation experiened in 
Denmark. The demonstration of opposing trade effects across both contexts thus adds a 
crucial dimension of nuance to existing work which has found a consistent negative effect for 
global trade volume, and trade openness on labour share (see appendix 6).  
 
In terms of the sectoral composition of employment and economic output, equally striking are 
the opposing coefficients on service sector employment between both countries. Typically, 
the accession of service sector employment has been associated with a dilution of union 
membership away from its core bases of industrial employment, although the parallel growth 
of public sector employment  - especially in Denmark – has served to mitigate the depressive 
effects of sectoral transition on union density, the effect of which has been shown to vary 
across national contexts in terms of welfare provision, and of the nature of union membership, 
and benefit administration. These depressive effects of service sector growth have occured in 
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the Irish context, despite associated workforce upskilling and real wage growth. Danish 
services employment has enjoyed comparative security from the effects of subsidiarity, 
outsourcing and subcontracting, as evidenced in the case of call centre work, a sector which is 
characterised by high degrees of labour flexibility. In finance and utilities, Danish labour has 
managed to retain a unified wage structure under market segmentation and firm 
rationalisation, resultinng in both high-performance labour flexibility, and wage stability with 
union bargaining around wage structure, and working time arrangement (Sorensen and 
Weinkopf 2009). The lack of a collective hedge against rationalisation and labour market 
flexibility in Ireland, coupled with the above negative coefficient suggests that the 
individualisation associated with service sector expansion has limited such capacities 
substantially, resulting in profound long-term labour share depression.  
 
Conversely, the growth of high-skilled, high-tech labour has managed to capitalise on the 
inherently flexible nature of mobile, short-term contract-based employment. Ireland rose to 
become one of the worlds highest exporters of software during the 1990’s  having capitalised 
both on sources of U.S. multinational investment, and on the substantial growth of an 
indigenous software sector (Ó Riain 2004). The informalised nature of such employment, 
coupled with low degrees of contractual security, contrary to that of low-wage service sector 
employment, has ensured that the skill-premium of such work has remained entrenched in 
both contexts, albeit to a greater extent in Ireland, consistent with the equalisation effects of 
coordinated market economies, relative to the greater potential skill-premium associated with 
liberal market economies. Given that flexibility within such sectors resides with the 
employee, rather than the firm, the accumulation of valuable skills in a flexible labour market 
suggests a shift in the bargaining capacities of labour relative to those of capital (Daudey and 
Decreuse 2006), an outcome which is largely substantiated by the above results. In such 
sectors, labour has tended to eschew collective representation, identifying more with 
mannagement given its comparatively lower hstorical need for collective insulation 
(Ebbinghaus et al 2011: 111). 
 
Finally, the opposing consumer price coefficients suggets a crucial distinction in terms of 
wage-lag (assuming the validity of the wage-lag hypothesis) which  implies that real wage 
growth lags behind that of productivity (Raffalovich et al 1992). The long-term effects of 
price index fluctuation are non-significant in the Irish context, whilst that of the short term is 
both negative and significant, relative to the positive long-term effect of Denmark. This 
dinstinction is thus suggestive of the presence of divergent wage-lag dynamics, and of 
potential cyclical effects in the dynamics of labour share, consistent with our underlying 
institutional narrative of the capacity of compensation to keep pace with productivity growth 
in the Danish  context. Relative to productivity growth, the proportion of labour compensation 
in Denmark is stationary relative to that of Ireland (ax5, 10), despite substantial gains in 
financial sector capital output.  
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Table 3. Labour market and financialisation models of labour share (OLS) 
 Δ ls (Labour share, GNI denominator) 
 Ireland Denmark 
 3. Labour market 4. Financialisation 3. Labour market 4. Financialisation 
lst-1 -1.485* -1.100** -.359* .034 
trade t-1  -8.761
+
  4.436 
Δ fdi -1.493**    
Δ mig -.107  .193  
migt-1 -.161*  .267  
Δ unemp .830*  .599***  
unempt-1     
Δ hours -.017  -.029
+
  
hourst-1     
Δ femlp   .414*  
femlpt-1   .061  
femlp 83-94t-1 -.288    
Δ finance    .344** 
financet-1  -.100  -.039 
Δ ls_const  .267***   
ls_const t-1  .328**   
Δ ls_man    -.088 
ls_man t-1    -.102 
Δ ls_serv    .785* 
ls_serv t-1    .049 
Δ  finance2  .138  .727 
     
Constant 109.316* 43.781* 15.767
+
 -.879 
Adj. R
2 
.9347 .9349 .6489 .8351 
Model F (7, 4) 11.87* (6, 7) 28.46** (7, 18) 19.11*** (9, 9) 16.65*** 
AIC 21.5908 36.8521 66.5961 43.5982 
Mean VIF 4.33 8.80 1.84 4.94 
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Table 3. Labour market and financialisation models of labour share (OLS) 
 Δ ls (Labour share, GNI denominator) 
 Ireland Denmark 
 3. Labour market 4. Financialisation 3. Labour market 4. Financialisation 
N 12 14 26 19 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Standardised coefficients, labour market model (Ireland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Standardised coefficients, labour market model (Denmark) 
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Finally, a set of additional models are included, specifying a number of labour market 
conditions (3), along with those associated with increased financialisation (4). We have 
introduced a subtle distinction into the Irish labour market model however; given that public 
employment consolidated comparatively earlier in Denmark, coupled with the presence of 
protections favourable to female labour market accession, the comparative lag of female 
labour force participation renders it difficult to capture the effects of female accession in a 
manner which permits valid comparison. Consequently, female labour force participation is 
modeled in the Irish context with a period-specific trend dummy, capturing the effects of 
female accession between 1983 and 1994. The inclusion of fdi in the Irish model is mandated,  
in light of the centrality of fdi dynamics to Irish labour market composition, as established in 
the preceding analyses. Denmark presents as favourable to increased female labour force 
accession, despite the expected depressive effects of female entry into low-skill, part-time 
employment which, coupled with the balancing of family demands, has tended to dilute 
female union participation (Ebbinghaus et al 2011: 112). The growth of public employment in 
Denmark has served to mitigate the precarity of increased accession however, coupled with a 
protective institutional context of high unionisation, extensive bargaining coverage, and 
welfare provision geared toward labour market activation.  
 
Conversely, the effect of Irish female labour force participation is negative, suggesting an 
intermediary effect on compensation depression vis-a-vis the absence of pro-active 
protections geared toward activation, and establishing greater workplace ties. Moreover, 
occupational growth has remained polarised in the Irish context, whereby parallel growth in 
both high and low-skilled occupations has led to a two-tier model of female labour market 
accession, between low-skilled personal services and sales, and high-skilled labour associated 
with public sector growth. In terms of human capital, women are achieving parity with men in 
terms of representation within certain sectors, however this has not translated into 
proportional advancements into upper-managerial roles (Turner and McMahon 2011). Public 
sector growth has been critical to both the Irish and Danish labour market structure, with both 
affording the opportunity for increased female participation. In Ireland, however, although 
females account for 65% of civil service employees, they represent only 12% of secretary 
generals (ibid: 236). Conversely, Denmark has seen the emergence of labour agreements of 
broader coverage, which include provisions for flexible working hours, negotiation of 
working time arrangements at firm level, and the provison of paid leave, thus enabling the 
achievement of a greater balance between work and family life, and long-term career 
advancement (Campbell an Pedersen 2011: 318; Torfing 1999).  
 
Similarly, the depressive effects of structural employment change introduced in model 2 are 
reflected in the effects of net migration, which exerts a negative long-term effect in Ireland, 
compared to its moderarte, insignificant effect in Denmark. During Ireland’s period of 
upskilling and educational upgrading, a condition which facilitated its capitalisation on new 
streams of fdi during the 1980’s and 1990’s (Kirby 2008), the displacement of domestic 
labour created a consequent shortfall in the low-skilled labour supply, which was met by 
increased immigration, particularly from European accession states, facilitated by centralised 
labour market deregulation. The net effect of these combined trends has been a movement of 
mobile employees into sectors of diminished contractual security and comparatively lower 
union coverage, resulting in a shift in bargaining power toward employers.  
 
Counter-intuitively, the effect of unemployment in both contexts is significant and positive 
(long-term unemployment did not achieve significance in any specification). Typically, 
unemployment has been associated with a reduction in bargaining capacity owing to over-
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supplies of labour which tend to depress labour shares, given the increased selectivity 
afforded firms in the selection process. In Denmark, the provisions of the Ghent  system, and 
the extent of bargaining coverage commbine to ensure a reduction in firm responsiveness to 
market signals concerning labour shedding, whilst favouring employee retention during times 
of economic hardhsip. Consistent with the skill profile of coordinated market economies, 
Danish activation measures as detailed in model 1, have further ensured long-term individual 
labour market competitiveness through upskilling. As a result, Danish unemployment levels 
have historically been muted compared to those of Ireland, and less susceptible to global 
economic fluctuation and signification (ax3, 11). Alternatively, the Irish direction may be 
indicitive of the presence of labour hoarding, resulting in a substantial lag between periods of 
economic downturn, and labour share responsiveness. This hypothesis is borne out, in part by 
evidence of the past four years, which shows a drastic inflation of Ireland’s labour share 
following the initiation of the financial crisis in 2007. Figure 7 thus suggests that the initial 
shortfall in Irish GDP prefigured labour shedding by approximately 2 years, whereafter the 
most recent labour share figures exhibit a return to their downward trending behaviour under 
the influence of high unemployment.  
 
Finally, working time exhibits little influence in both Denmark and Ireland, in which the 
effect is neither significant nor substantial in magnitude. Bargaining in the Danish services 
sector has often focused on the regulation of working hours and conditions beyond those of 
direct compensation (Sorensen and Weinkopf 2009), whilst its flexicurity measures have 
ensured commensurate labour market protections for vulnerable employees; in this sense, it is 
interesting that aggregate working hours imply a marginally depressive effect on labour share. 
In both Ireland and Denmark, annual working hours have fallen, albeit with substantial 
sectoral covariation, and differences in the extent to which clear boundaries between work 
and private life are demarcated (Ciccia and Ó Riain 2013). Falling working hours, coupled 
with incresed labour input productivity growth thus appears to present a moderate source of 
labour share depression in the form of proportional compensation reduction. This is especially 
interesting in the Danish case, in which it appears the wage-lag effect is absent, suggesting 
further research into the components of labour share at sectoral level (i.e. productivity, labour 
input, employment diversity) is warranted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Standardised coefficients, financialisation model (Ireland) 
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Figure 17. Standardised coefficients, financialisation model (Denmark) 
 
 
The results of our parallel financialisation models are somewhat ambiguous however, 
suggestive of a crucial divergence from established cross-national narratives of the depressive 
effects of financial sector consolidation (Atkinson 2009; de Serres et al 2002; Diwan 2001; 
Guscina 2006; Kus 2012; ILO 2013). Variable specifications were employed in order to 
account for structural differences between Denmark and Ireland, and to control for the 
presence of alternating sources of confounding on the financialisation effect. For Ireland, this 
model included construction labour share, trade volume and financial sector wages. Given 
that the sectoral effects of finance are typically cited as key to its depressive influence on 
labour share, the specific nature of the Irish financial bubble, buoyed as it was by an 
outpouring of investment into labour-intensive construction suggests a counter-balance of the 
depressive influence of low financial labour shares, with those of high-share construction, a 
suspicion borne out by the substantial inequalities between both sectors in terms of observed 
labour share (ax4, 10). Furthermore in Denmark, the growth of its capital intensity in finance 
has been complemented with parallel service sector employment, and declining 
manufacturing employment, profitability and output (ax5, 11-13). Both Ireland and Denmark 
also exhibit negative correlations distributed across lags, between labour share and domestic 
credit volume, and financial sector gross operating surplus (ax4, 14 and 15; ax5, 14 and 15).  
 
Strikingly, despite the substantial difference in output and capital relative to other Danish 
sectors, the effect of financialisation under additional sector controls, and in the absence of 
colinearity, is positive and significant. This model should be interpreted with a measure of 
caution however; although variance inflation diagnostics indicate an absence of colinearity, 
the non-significance of the correction term in the Danish model suggest the presence of 
cointegration may not be relied upon. Nonetheless, when compared to the negative effect of 
financialisation in the Irish context, the divergence suggests a crucial nuance has been 
overlooked in established narratives of the effects of financial sector capital intensity, which 
emphasise the depressive sectoral effects of financial sector intensity without a 
complementary illustration of institutional covariates, as has been attempted through the 
preceding models. Therefore, the comparative stationarity of Danish labour shares, relative to 
the substantial growth of its financial output, is suggestive of the efficacy of the redistributive 
45 
 
capacities of state and labour market institutions, which generate stability in labour/capital 
ratios, despite the inherently global orientation of much boundary-less financial activity.  
 
By contrast, Irish capital flow deregulation resulted in a redirection of investment away from 
productive sources located within the real economy, toward speculative, short-term sources of 
liquidity in the form of property devlopment (Ó Riain 2012). Therefore, despite boosting 
output and returns to labour in both contruction and finance, the result was a precarious 
dependence on an inherently unstable source of growth, coupled with an increased reliance of 
state institutions – conversely associated with labour market resilience in Denmark – on 
precarious sources of funding. The overall effect of this sustained regime of financialisation 
and deregulation was an entrenchment of capital market porousness, an augmentation of firm 
mobility, and a compounding of the dependence of Irish growth on sources inherently 
exposed to global vicissitudes, such as those driven by fdi, and in the Irish context, 
fluctuations in international financial markets. The utility of this model resides not in its 
confirmation of the depressive influence of financialisation in the Irish context – arguably this 
model is incapable of factoring parallel processes associated with financialisation, such as 
growth in private credit volume, and the orientation of managerialisam toward short-term 
dividends – but in its capacity to sensitise us toward the mitigating influence of resilience-
augmenting state and labour market institutions, which appear to profoundly temper the 
depressive impact of financial sector growth in Denmark. On the basis of these results, it is 
clear that a structural-sectoral account of the impact of financialisation alone is insufficient to 
explain the contrasting dynamics of sectoral diversification across states.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
On the basis of the foregoing analyses, it is clear that existing heuristics of cross-national 
comparison are in need of revision, and that the inferences of cross-national labour share 
studies utilising pooled time-series modeling are overlooking a critical source of inter-state 
variation and nuance, both in terms of coefficient magnitude, and in terms of their elaboration 
of the mechanisms through which the covariates of labour share exert their influence in an 
opposing manner across national contexts. Although the varieties of capitalism perspective 
performs adaquately as a locus around which to distinguish the essential institutional 
configurations of individual states, it insufficiently developed the scope of its empirical 
testing. Therefore, although existing research has empahsised the capacity of institutional 
ideal-type convergence to foster enhanced growth capabilites, little attention has been paid to 
the manner in which the differentating axis of coordination generates divergent regimes of 
labour share distribution, giving rise to contrasting mechanisms of factor share mediation 
between states with enhanced union coverage, universalist welfare provision, and pro-active 
labour market policies & industrial relations systems. The preceding analysis has shown that 
the effect of a myriad of institutional and structural variables contrast profoundly between 
national contexts, whereby the complementarities described by the varieties of capitalism 
heuristic give rise to opposing historical outcomes for labour. Arguably, existing theory fails 
to sufficiently incorporate both this potential for inter-state configurational diversity, and for 
its role in determining national outcomes beyond those of growth augmentation. Simialrly, the 
axis of welfare state retrenchment limits our ability to account for the diversification of 
welfare and protection measures in response to global change in a manner which, rather than 
devolving responsibility for social security to market or individual with the effect of increased 
insecurity, develops in line with the requirements of labour market diversification. 
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The preceding discussion offers only a partial perspective on the dynamics of compensation 
however. As a crucial intermediary between income inequality and national economic 
activity, labour’s share of income determines the respetive levels of compensation available 
for distribution amongst employees, a level which in turn influences the overal distribution of 
income at national levels. Further works in this area, particularly those concerning income 
inequality, should pay careful attention to the role of labour share in the income equality mix 
– a dimension typically absent from accounts which work merely from manifest income 
distribution alone. This restrictive level of operation misses a critical intermediary step in the 
establishment of relative compensation rates across countries, and indeed, in the very setting 
of the pool of income relative to capital returns. Crucially, this research has revealed that  the 
range of institutional and structural covariates typically implicated in the income equality 
narrative exhibit robust relationships with labour share levels, such that additional works 
which fail to take account of the augmentation of capital-labour ratios run the risk – especially 
in comparative work – of missing a crucial axis of cross-national differentiation.  
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Appendix 1: Data and descriptive statistics (Ireland and Denmark) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics, coverage and variable descriptions (Ireland) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Coverage Description 
ls 63.908 4.373 
54.341 
(2003) 
71.045 
(1980) 
1960 – 2012 Labour share 
left 14.298 3.520 
9 
(1982) 
23 
(1996) 
1960 – 2006 
Left legislative seats 
as % all parliamentary 
seats 
union 52.893 9.109 
34.9 
(2007) 
64 
(1978) 
1960 – 2009 
Union density (union 
members as % total 
workforce) 
welfare 7.541 1.656 
5.031 
(2000) 
11.245 
(2010) 
1970 – 2011 
Welfare spending as 
% of GDP 
fdi 4.005 7.828 
-14.922 
(2005) 
26.148 
(2000) 
1974 – 2011 
Foreign direct 
investment net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
trade 0.623 0.182 
0.412 
(1976) 
1.078 
(2002) 
1960 – 2012 
% share of combined 
global goods imports 
and exports 
service 62.918 5.051 
55.6 
(1983) 
75.5 
(2010) 
1983 - 2010 
Employment in 
services as % total 
employment 
comp 37.145 21.040 
14.299 
(1986) 
72.608 
(2011) 
1974 – 2011 
Computer and 
communications as % 
total service exports 
cpi 6.211 5.637 
-4.480 
(2009) 
20.876 
(1981) 
1961 – 2011 
Consumer price index 
- % change on 
previous period 
mig 0.310 6.994 
-14.495 
(1960) 
16.356 
(2005) 
1960 – 2009 Net migration rate 
unemp 9.181 4.352 
3.900 
(2001) 
16.800 
(1985/1986) 
1960 – 2012 Unemployment rate 
hours 2188.293 242.775 
1803.780 
(2010) 
2629.95 
(1960) 
1960 - 2011 
Mean annual hours 
worked 
femlp 51.531 9.216 
36.907 
(1984) 
64.219 
(2007) 
1983-2011 
Female labour force 
participation rate 
finance 30.618 6.351 
22.910 
(1995) 
40.676 
(2008) 
1995 – 2009 
FIRE gross operating 
surplus as %  all 
sectors 
ls_const 95.124 9.602 
84.498 
(2006) 
122.905 
(2009) 
1994 – 2009 
Construction adjusted 
labour share 
finance2 15.092 1.623 
12.012 
(1995) 
17.328 
(2009) 
1995 - 2009 
Wages and salaries of 
finance as % total 
economy 
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Descriptive statistics, coverage and variable descriptions (Denmark) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Coverage Description 
ls 59.234 1.845 
55.882 
(2006) 
62.6444 
(1980) 
1960 – 2012 Labour share 
left 45.404 3.705 
35 
(1974) 
50 
(1972) 
1960 – 2006 
Left legislative seats 
as % all parliamentary 
seats 
union 70.402 7.876 
56.9 
(1960) 
80.8 
(1983) 
1960 – 2009 
Union density (union 
members as % total 
workforce) 
welfare 16.951 2.574 
10.7 
(1973) 
20.3 
(1993) 
1970 – 2011 
Welfare spending as 
% of GDP 
fdi 1.744 3.939 
-2.465 
(2010) 
22.497 
(2000) 
1974 – 2011 
Foreign direct 
investment net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
trade 1.025 .283 
.549 
(2012) 
1.560 
(1962) 
1960 – 2012 
% share of combined 
global goods imports 
and exports 
service 69.686 3.939 
62.5 
(1981) 
77.7 
(2010) 
1981 - 2010 
Employment in 
services as % total 
employment 
comp 35.618 5.203 
27.551 
(1997) 
43.372 
(1999) 
1975 – 2004 
Computer and 
communications as % 
total service exports 
cpi 5.075 3.654 
15.275 
(1974) 
1.258 
(1993) 
1967 – 2011 
Consumer price index 
- % change on 
previous period 
mig 1.441 1.500 
-1.779 
(1975) 
5.541 
(1995) 
1960 – 2011 Net migration rate 
unemp 4.679 2.638 
.6 
(1970) 
9.6 
(1993) 
1960 – 2012 Unemployment rate 
hours 1599.730 92.305 
1493.94 
(1994) 
1879.65 
(1970) 
1970 - 2009 
Mean annual hours 
worked 
femlp 76.446 1.627 
72.784 
(1983) 
79.102 
(1992) 
1983-2011 
Female labour force 
participation rate 
finance 33.534 3.340 
25.088 
(1970) 
44.900 
(2009) 
1970 – 2009 
FIRE gross operating 
surplus as %  all 
sectors 
ls_man 74.384 3.210 
69.026 
(2000) 
81.846 
(1974) 
1970-2009 
Manufacturing 
adjusted labour share 
ls_serv 66.522 2.539 
61.790 
(1970) 
73.095 
(2009) 
1970-2009 
Services adjusted 
labour share 
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Descriptive statistics, coverage and variable descriptions (Denmark) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Coverage Description 
finance2 14.875 2.125 
12.8042 
(1995) 
18.409 
(2008) 
1990-2009 
Wages and salaries of 
finance as % total 
economy 
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Appendix 2: Unit root tests (Ireland and Denmark) 
 
 
Unit root tests (Ireland)* 
Variable ADF (Level) ADF (Δ) ADF (Δ2) 
ADF 
Result 
ls 
-1.440 
(-2.936) 
-2.027 
(-2.938) 
-5.724 
(-2.941) 
I(2) 
left 
-3.072 
(-2.950) 
- - I(0) 
union 
-0.570 
(-2.941) 
-2.426 
(-2.944) 
-5.650 
(-2.947) 
I(2) 
welfare 
-2.016 
(-2.964) 
-2.450 
(-2.966) 
-4.132 
(-2.969) 
I(2) 
fdi 
-2.554 
(-2.975) 
-2.692 
(-2.978) 
-3.798 
(-2.980) 
I(2) 
trade 
-1.729 
(-2.933) 
-1.922 
(-2.936) 
-3.932 
(-2.938) 
I(3) 
service 
0.683 
(-3.000) 
-2.306 
(-3.000) 
-3.033 
(-3.00) 
I(2) 
comp 
0.177 
(-2.975) 
-2.933 
(-2.978) 
-3.598 
(-2.980) 
I(1) 
cpi 
-1.138 
(-2.938) 
-4.368 
(-2.941) 
- I(1) 
mig 
-2.198 
(-2.941) 
-2.573 
(-2.944) 
-5.150 
(-2.947) 
I(2) 
unemp 
-1.936 
(-2.933) 
-2.702 
(-2.936) 
-5.430 
(-2.938) 
I(2) 
hours 
-1.160 
(-2.936) 
-3.673 
(-2.938) 
- I(1) 
femlp 
-.787 
(-3.000) 
-2.638 
(-3.000) 
-3.905 
(-3.000) 
I(2) 
finance 
-1.699 
(-3.000) 
-1.424 
(-3.000) 
- - 
ls_const 
-1.141 
(-3.000) 
.319 
(-3.000) 
- - 
finance2 
-.412 
(-3.000) 
-2.623 
(-3.000) 
- - 
 
*Lag setting of 3 used for all augmented Dickey-Fuller tests; 5% critical values of test statistic in parentheses 
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Stationarity tests (Denmark)* 
Variable ADF (Level) ADF (Δ) ADF (Δ2) 
ADF 
Result 
ls 
-1.661 
(-2.933) 
-4.731 
(-2.936) 
- 
 
I(1) 
left 
-1.615 
(-2.950) 
-5.009 
(-2.952) 
- I(1) 
union 
-1.904 
(-2.941) 
-2.125 
(-2.944) 
-4.769 
(-2.947) 
I(2) 
welfare 
-2.336 
(-2.966) 
-3.253 
(-2.969) 
- I(1) 
fdi 
-2.950 
(-2.964) 
-5.566 
(-2.966) 
- I(1) 
trade 
-0.985 
(-2.933) 
-3.594 
(-2.936) 
- I(1) 
service 
1.465 
(-3.000) 
-1.824 
(-3.000) 
-3.615 
(-3.000) 
I(2) 
comp 
-2.809 
(-3.000) 
-2.179 
(-3.000) 
-3.622 
(-3.000) 
I(2) 
cpi 
-1.122 
(-2.955) 
-3.003 
(-2.958) 
- I(1) 
mig 
-1.775 
(-2.936) 
-4.808 
(-2.938) 
- I(1) 
unemp 
-1.682 
(-2.933) 
-4.111 
(-2.936) 
- I(1) 
hours 
-2.130 
(-2.969) 
-2.302 
(-2.972) 
-2.992 
(-2.975) 
I(2) 
femlp 
-2.280 
(-3.000) 
-3.232 
(-3.000) 
- I(1) 
finance 
-0.742 
(-2.969) 
-1.798 
(-2.972) 
-2.584 
(-2.975) 
- 
ls_man 
-1.915 
(-2.969) 
-4.312 
(-2.972) 
- I(1) 
ls_serv 
-1.502 
(-2.969) 
-3.415 
(-2.972) 
- I(2) 
finance2 
-.363 
(-3.000) 
-1.759 
(-3.000) 
- - 
 
*Lag setting of 3 used for all augmented Dickey-Fuller tests; 5% critical values of test statistic in parentheses 
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Appendix 3: Combined variable graphs (Ireland and Denmark) 
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1. Labour share (GNI Denominator) 
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2. Union density 
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3. Leftist cabinet 
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4. Welfare spending 
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5. FDI inflows 
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6. Global trade share 
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7. Service sector employment 
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8. Computer and communications exports 
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9. Consumer price index change 
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10. Net migration 
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11. Unemployment rate 
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12. Annual hours worked 
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13. Female labour force participation 
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14. Financial sector gross operating surplus (% all sectors) 
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15. Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% GDP) 
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Appendix 4: Labour share and sectoral graphs (Ireland) 
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1. Productivity growth and labour share trends: Ireland, 1960-2012 
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2. Agriculture, 1986-2010 (collapse in GVA 2004-2005) (OECD) 
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3. Wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotel, Ireland, 1986-2010 (OECD) 
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4. Construction, 1986-2010* post-07 collapse in employment inflates slef-employed 
remuneration estimate and resulting labour share (OECD) 
 
63 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Gross operating surplus Gross value added
Labour share (within sector) Employment
Self-employment (within sector)
F
in
a
n
c
e
 a
s
 %
 a
ll 
s
e
c
to
rs
 
 
5. Finance, insurance and real estate, 1986-2010 (OECD) 
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6. Manufacturing, 1986-2010 (OECD) 
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7. Industry, 1986-2010 (OECD) 
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8. Community, social and personal service, 1986-2010 (OECD) 
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9. Combined services, 1986-2010 (OECD) 
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10. Sectoral decomposition of adjusted labour share, 1990-2008 (KLEMS) 
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11. Sectoral decomposition of crude productivity, 1970-2010 (KLEMS) 
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12. Sectoral decomposition of employment, 1970-2009 (KLEMS) 
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13. Sectoral decomposition of gross value added, 1970-2009 (KLEMS) 
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14. Sectoral decomposition of gross operating surplus, 1990-2009 (KLEMS) 
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14. Credit volume cross-correlogram 
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15. Finance cross-correlogram 
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Appendix 5: Labour share and sectoral graphs (Denmark) 
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1. Agriculture, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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2. Wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotel, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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3. Construction, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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4. Finance, insurance and real estate, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
71 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Gross operating surplus Gross value added
Labour share (within sector) Employment
Self-employment (within sector)
M
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
 a
s
 %
 a
ll 
s
e
c
to
rs
 
 
5. Manufacturing, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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6. Industry, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
72 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Gross operating surplus Gross value added
Labour share (within sector) Employment
Self-employment (within sector)
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
, 
s
o
c
ia
l 
a
n
d
 p
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
a
s
 %
 a
ll 
s
e
c
to
rs
 
 
7. Community, social and personal service, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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8. Services, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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9. Sectoral decomposition of adjusted labour share, 1970-2009 (KLEMS & OECD) 
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10. Sectoral decomposition of crude productivity, 1970-2009 (KLEMS) 
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11. Sectoral decomposition of employment, 1970-2009 (KLEMS) 
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12. Sectoral decomposition of gross value added, 1970-2009 (KLEMS) 
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13. Sectoral decomposition of gross operating surplus, 1970-2009 (KLEMS) 
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14. Credit volume cross-correlogram 
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15. Finance cross-correlogram 
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Appendix 6: Labour share meta-analysis 
 
 Kristal 2010 
Daudey and 
Decreuse 
2006 
Daudey and 
Garcia-
Lenalosa 2007 
Decreuse and 
Maarek 2008 
Diwan 2001 
European 
Commission 
2007 
Guscina 2006 Harrison 2005 
Jaumotte and 
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EU-11 OECD 
Advanced 
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Advanced 
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OECD 
U.S. 
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Data source 
AMECO, 
OECD 
OECD UNIDO 
UNIDO, 
World Bank 
UN SNA 
AEMCO, EU 
KLEMS 
OECD, IMF UN SNA 
OECD, ILO, 
UNIDO 
UN SNA - 
Model estimation method OLS, fe OLS, fe OLS, fe GMM, fe OLS, fe OLS, fe OLS, fe OLS OLS, fe OLS OLS 
Dependent Δ labour share Labour share GINI Labour share Labour share Labour share Labour share Labour share Labour share Labour share Δ labour share 
Productivity -*      -**   -*  
Unemployment -* -*  -***      - - 
Inflation +       -   -** 
Union density +* +***    + +  - +* +* 
Strike activity +          - 
Leftist cabinet -*           
Government spending +*    +***   +**    
FDI -   -***    -**    
Net migration +        -***   
Education  +***          
Openness 
(economic/financial) 
 - - +***  -***   - -*  
Labour share   -*         
Manufacturing labour share   -         
Per capita GDP   -***         
International trade -*   - -  -***     
Regulation     +***    +**   
Financial crisis          -**  
Economic growth           -** 
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